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Martin Behrman And New Orleans Civic Development, 1904-1920

By ROBERT W. WILLIAMS, JR.

who teaches at East Carolina College, Greenville, North Carolina.

TODAY a reform mayor heads the New Orleans city government and the members of the once powerful Regular Democratic machine known as the Choctaw Club can recall better days. Old-timers among the Choctaws in their clubrooms across St. Charles Avenue from City Hall remember when their leader, Martin Behrman, was boss on both sides of the street and ran the affairs of the machine and the city with a driving force since unequalled. The story of this man, Martin Behrman, is the story of municipal politics in New Orleans during most of the first quarter of the twentieth century. But in spite of his predominant place in New Orleans politics, he stands as perhaps the most neglected figure among the city political bosses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Volumes have been written about men like William M. Tweed of New York, Albert A. Ames of Minneapolis, and Edwin S. Vare of Philadelphia, while only a few pages chronicle the career of Martin Behrman, who in many ways was the most creditable of his fellows.[1]

Martin Behrman and his administration ushered in an era of civic advancement greater than any period since the Civil War. Crippled by carpetbag debt, revenue restrictions,

[1]William B. Munro, *Bibliography of Municipal Government in the United States* (Cambridge, 1927), 36-39.

and a penchant for inaction, previous city governments had been able to show little progress.[2] But Behrman developed formulas for forestalling stagnation. At the close of his fourth administration he was able to look back on substantial improvements in sewerage, drainage, paving, water supply, and the public school system. He proudly pointed to the Public Belt Railroad and the extensive park system throughout the city. Property values had risen considerably and business was flourishing.

At the beginning of the twentieth century much of New Orleans was a foul and unsightly pesthole. Drainage canals often stood full of water. Mosquitoes bred in open cesspools, in trash-choked gutters smelling of liquid household waste, and around brick vaults housing fecal refuse. Flies and mosquitoes carried filth and disease to rain water caught on roofs and stored in cypress cisterns, the only water supply for 82 per cent of the city's inhabitants. The water pressure diminished from thirty pounds in the business district to practically nothing at the edge of town. It was impracticable to maintain streets which were periodically flooded by surface drainage.[3]

Lack of accomodations prohibited an estimated 69.51 per cent of school-age children from attending school. The sixty-three buildings for white children and nine for colored children were overcrowded and dilapidated.[4] Superintendent

[2]John S. Kendall, *History of New Orleans* (2 vols., New York, 1922), II, 587; Martin Behrman, *Civic Development* (New Orleans, 1915), 5, 6.

[3]Walter L. Dodd, *Report on the Health and Sanitary Survey of the City of New Orleans, 1918-1919* (New Orleans, 1919), 94. This survey was conducted by the author under the joint auspices of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans, the Parish of Orleans, and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York. See also *Report on the Drainage of the City of New Orleans by the Advisory Board, 1895 (New Orleans, 1895)*, 47; Behrman, *Civic Development, 8.*

[4]James J. McLaughlin, "Educational Organization and Progress in American Cities: New Orleans," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* XXV (1905), 261-62. Figures as to enrollment are supported by Education Census reports which show an estimated 96,343 school children resident in New Orleans during the year 1904. Only 31,600 of these were enrolled in school. Total population of the city for that year was 309,639. *Annual Report of the Department of the Interior: Commissioner of Education, 1905* (Washington, 1907), 448.

Warren Easton, speaking before a meeting of the New Orleans Educational Association in 1905, pointed to the need for at least one additional school building in each of the seventeen districts. He also deplored the low salaries paid to teachers and the small appropriation made yearly for support of the public schools.[5]

The business interests of New Orleans, depending to a large extent on the efficient and low-cost operation of the port, were dissatisfied with high drayage costs to and from the docks and from one dock to another. Private railroad switching service was expensive, slow, and undependable. It often took three to five days to get a carload transferred from a trunk line to a waterfront switch on the same line; it was not uncommon for weeks to elapse before a car was transferred from one track to another.[6]

In the election campaign of 1904 Martin Behrman promised the voters of New Orleans to change all this.[7] In the ensuing sixteen years he was able to initiate many reforms and improvements in the fields of finance, administration, public works, and municipal services. A study of his conduct of city affairs indicates that his efforts met with considerable success.

Behrman's first general problem was money—or rather the lack of it. From the assessment for each dollar valuation of property for state and local taxes, New Orleans was allowed only twenty-two mills. Of this amount, ten mills were set aside by law for payment of the city's bonded debt, and two mills for operation and maintenance of sewerage, water, and drainage systems. This left only ten mills for improving and repairing the streets, and operating other public functions of the city. The two mills earmarked for sewerage, water, and drainage were painfully inadequate; the ten mills left to perform all the other functions of the city government were

[5]New Orleans *Daily Picayune,* February 28, 1905.
[6]*Ibid.,* March 23, 1905.
[7]New Orleans *Item,* August 25, 1904.

clearly not enough.[8] In addition to a low income the city had a poor credit reputation dating from the prodigal finance of Reconstruction days. Impairment of credit was so great that bonds issued during the 1860's and 1870's often had to bear interest at rates as high as 7 per cent if they were to be sold.[9]

One of the first matters that faced Behrman was the problem of $100,000 worth of certificates of outstanding indebtedness held by the American Bonding Company of New Orleans. He paid it promptly and in full by immediately negotiating the sale of a Canal Street ferry franchise and applying the proceeds to the debt. He then sold more certificates and provided a definite means of meeting interest payments promptly.[10] By meeting this obligation Behrman set the pattern regarding city debts that was to be sustained throughout his administrations.

Prior to 1906, the banks holding custody of public funds had paid no interest on these funds to the city. In June of that year, Behrman proposed to the city Board of Liquidation that steps be taken to remedy this situation. He suggested that the board advertise for bids and that the bank or banks which offered the highest interest on public funds be awarded their custody. These banks would be designated as fiscal agents for the city. R. M. Walmsley, president of the board, expressed the opinion that the city had no right to accept interest on public funds. A motion was made to proceed with the business of selecting a fiscal agent and the mayor was temporarily overruled. The New Orleans National Bank was selected over the protest of the mayor, who felt that all local banks should have an equal opportunity to secure the deposit of the funds. On the following day Behrman consulted with the city attorney and subsequently brought suit

[8]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 2.

[9]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 587; Rudolph S. Hecht, *Municipal Finances of New Orleans, 1890-1916* (New Orleans, n. d.), 4, 5. One issue actually bore interest at 10 per cent.

[10]Martin Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, December 26, 1922. This was an installment of Behrman's informal reminiscences published in the *Item*, October 22, 1922-March 23, 1923.

against the Board of Liquidation to prevent the proposed deposit of municipal funds in the New Orleans National Bank.[11]

On January 9 of the following year, while the suit was still pending, the mayor met with the board and discussed with it what he termed a "clarification of public policy" made by the state legislature since the action of the board and since the filing of the suit. A recent "declaration of policy," passed as an act of the legislature, had stated that all boards entrusted with funds derived from taxes should be made to earn interest whenever practicable. This statement of the legislature, in which Behrman's hand may well be suspected, contained other provisions which tended to sustain the mayor in his argument with the Board of Liquidation. According to the act, the vote of any member against the deposit of such funds at interest constituted a "breach of trust" and a misdemeanor. Punishment included a $1,000 fine, or six months to one year imprisonment, or both.[12] Behrman did not mention that the act passed by the legislature had been vetoed by the Governor as unconstitutional. This omission, however, was noted by A. Generes Dufour, special attorney for the board. A resolution was again offered that the board advertise for bids and again the resolution was defeated.[13]

Behrman's unpromising position was not improved by the rough handling his suit against the board received in the courts, but the final action of the board came close to approximating the mayor's original stand. On February 18, 1907, the state Supreme Court confirmed an anti-Behrman decision of a lower court.[14] At a meeting of the board during the second week of March, 1907, the firm of Miller, Dufour, and Dufour presented a legal opinion concerning the action of the Supreme Court in the recent suit. According to this interpretation, the board had a right to choose its own fiscal

[11] *Ibid.*, January 2, 1923.
[12] New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, January 10, 1907.
[13] *Ibid.*, January 11, 1907.
[14] *Ibid.*, February 19, 1907.

agents and could require payment of interest, but it could not be compelled to require such payment. For the third time Martin Behrman offered a resolution that funds be placed with a bank which would pay for their use, and that bids be solicited. The resolution failed to pass. Ashton Phelps made a motion fixing the interest rate at 3½ per cent and naming three banks of deposit. Although the mayor made it clear that he preferred the acceptance of bids, the board unanimously approved Phelps' motion and his selection of banks.[15] Thereafter public funds accrued interest for the city.[16] For all practical purposes, the mayor had succeeded in making interest on city funds an additional source of revenue.

Most of the bond issues under the Behrman administration evoked little comment from the press, but the series known as S and W Bonds (Sewerage and Water Bonds) occasioned a storm of protest. Particularly loud were the hostile declarations of the New Orleans *Item* and Major Lynn Dinkins, president of the Interstate Bank of New Orleans.[17] The Board of Liquidation had offered a $4,000,000 portion of the issue for sale in February, 1909. It had some difficulty in finding investors but finally disposed of $1,000,000 of the bonds to eight local banks in May, 1909.[18] There remained $7,000,000 of the complete issue for sale. The board advertised for bids for the remaining bonds and met in April of 1910 to consider offers. Only one bid was offered for the bonds but several bids were made for deposit of the money that would be obtained by selling the bonds. The lone offer for the purchase of the bonds included a bid for the deposit of money resultant from the sale. This bid was presented by Major Dinkins of Interstate Bank. The attorney for the board expressed the opinion that this combined bid was illegal since advertisements for sale of the bonds and for security of the deposits had been made separately. The press attacked the city's method of handling the bonds at this time, and

[15]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, January 3, 1923.
[16]*Ibid.*, January 2, 1923.
[17]New Orleans *Item*, January 21-February 9, 1909.
[18]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, December 31, 1922.

again in October when once again the city failed to sell the remaining $7,000,000 of the issue. The bonds were finally disposed of at a discount of 4.6259 per cent to the Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Company and Whitney Central Trust and Savings Company.[19]

Other bond issues of the Behrman administration failed to provoke much public comment. A $750,000 bond issue was floated on November 13, 1906. This issue, known as the New Courthouse Bonds, was sold at par and accrued interest plus a premium of $1,000.[20] In July of 1909, $198,000 in bonds were floated to pay schoolteachers' salaries which had been due from the city since 1887. This issue was sold to the Whitney Central Trust and Savings Company for par and accrued interest.[21] In October of 1915, $100,000 in Audubon Park bonds were sold to Isidore Newman and Company for par and accrued interest. In December of the following year, $4,500,000 in the city's Serial Gold Bonds were sold to the Hibernia Bank and Trust Company at 104.337 per cent.[22]

The largest financial venture of the Behrman regime was the consolidation of much of the city's bonded and regular debt in 1916. This consolidation was made possible by an amendment to the state constitution approved by the voters in that year. The immediate impetus for such action arose out of the city's need for street paving which was an immediate and pressing problem from the beginning of the Behrman regime. New streets were needed; old streets were in poor repair. Upon request of the mayor, the city council let paving contracts immediately, but the meager funds

[19]Kendall, *History of New Orleans,* II, 595.

[20]Horace P. Phillips, "Bonded Debt of New Orleans, 1822-1920, Inclusive," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly,* III (1920), 5,96-611. The issue of these bonds was authorized by the legislature of 1904. They bore interest at the rate of 5 per cent.

[21]*Ibid.;* Kendall, *History of New Orleans,* II, 595.

[22]Phillips, "Bonded Debt of New Orleans," 596-611; Kendall, *History of New Orleans,* II, 595.

available for payment of such contracts soon proved inadequate.[23]

The city was required by law to set aside for public improvement the sum of $400,000 annually from its general revenue. Behrman had petitioned the legislature to allow the city to issue public improvement certificates against the $4,000,000 that would accrue for the purpose during the next ten years, thereby allowing the immediate use of the money. By the end of the year 1910, $3,439,999 had been expended which was almost as much as the entire amount that would accrue for the ten-year period. The legislature had then allowed the issuance of certificates against anticipated public improvement revenue for an additional five-year period. Three years later this debt had risen to $6,000,000 and bore interest at 5 per cent. The problem of financing street repairing had also been attacked from other directions. In 1910 a partial solution to the problem had been found by revamping a city ordinance that placed 79 per cent of the cost of street paving on the city. The ordinance had been changed so that the city bore only 20 per cent, while property-holders paid the balance.[24]

Another attempt at economy had been the construction of an asphalt repair plant by the city. Private contractors' bids for this work had been so high that the council felt that money could be saved if the city were to do its own repair work. The plant, erected at a cost of $77,202.48, had gone into operation on September 1, 1906. During the first year it had maintained over 390,000 square yards of paving. Increased paving and expiration of outside contracts had made additional work for the plant in subsequent years.[25] Meanwhile, Public Works Commissioner E. E. LaFaye had cut building program and repair costs to a minimum on all projects other

[23]New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, January 31, 1905; Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 553.

[24]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 553.

[25]New Orleans *Item*, December 30, 1922.

than paving. But still there was a shortage of funds and the debt mounted.[26]

In 1916 Behrman and LaFaye decided that a bond issue of $9,000,000 would be necessary to effect funding of the debt. In order to accomplish this an amendment to the state constitution would be necessary. At the suggestion of the mayor, Choctaw legislators secured the necessary legislation.[27] The resulting amendment was a far-reaching instrument that virtually gave financial independence to New Orleans. Paving may have pointed to the need for such a law, but it was not the only matter treated therein. The law provided for the issue of Gold Serial Bonds by the city of New Orleans in the amount of $9,000,000. Of this amount, $3,000,000 in bonds was to be sold at once and used for various purposes. Outstanding schoolteachers' salary bonds were to be retired. Indebtedness of the public schools, not to exceed $650,000, was to be paid. Payments of $500,000 borrowed by the city during the storm emergency of 1915 and $1,350,000 owed to banks of New Orleans were also directed. The remainder was to be applied to public improvement certificate payments.[28]

The most important provision of the constitutional amendment allowed the commission council and the Board of Liquidation to issue and negotiate bonds when supported by the majority of the property-owning taxpayers who were registered voters. Confirmation of the voters was not necessary in times of emergency. Bond issues were limited to 10 per cent of the total assessed valuation of New Orleans property, but excluded from the allowed amount were several past issues and all future issues on the Public Belt Railroad or any other revenue-producing utility. This amendment was thought by the majority of New Orleans voters to be of benefit to the

[26]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 554.

[27]*Ibid.*

[28]Solomon Wolff (ed.), *Constitution and Statutes of Louisiana* (3 vols., Indianapolis, 1920), III, 2294.

city. There were 31,767 votes cast for the amendment, and 17,198 against it.[29]

The political faction opposing the Choctaws in the mayoralty campaign of 1920 assailed this amendment on the grounds that it had destroyed the reserve fund that had been set aside for public improvements by the city charters of 1896, 1882, and 1912. The constitutional amendment of 1916 provided that the reservation of 20 per cent of the revenue should no longer be required by law.[30]

During Behrman's time, New Orleans was cursed with a form of government that provided insufficient legal coordination and integration. In the mayor-council-board type of government in effect until 1912, the mayor was not a chief executive, but acted with a multiplicity of boards as a co-executor and co-administrator of the city's affairs.[31]

In 1912, a group of citizens in opposition to the Choctaw machine attempted to clip the feathers of Choctaw Chief Behrman by setting up a commission form of government. The charter adopted in that year was not the work of the reformers but was a substitute that had originated with the machine.[32]

After 1912 the new city charter provided for a commission of five members elected at large. The commission council, meeting as a body, was to determine legislative policy, but each member was the administrative head of a separate department.[33] The Department of Public Affairs was re-

[29]*Ibid.*

[30]New Orleans *Item,* September 1, 1920; *Acts of Louisiana, 1882,* No. 20., Sec. 66; *Acts of Louisiana, 1896,* No. 45, Sec. 95; *Acts of Louisiana, 1912,* No. 159, Sec. 40.

[31]*Acts of Louisiana, 1896,* No. 45; *Acts of Louisiana, 1912,* No. 159.

[32]The year 1912 did not actually mark a first conversion to commission government in New Orleans. In 1870 affairs of the city were entrusted to a commission of eight members. The Galveston commission, often thought to be the first commission government, almost duplicated the New Orleans 1870 organization. William O. Scroggs, *Commission Government in the South* (Baton Rouge, 1912), 127.

[33]*Acts of Louisiana, 1912,* No. 159.

served for the mayor and included law, civil service, and publicity. The Department of Public Finance was responsible for the receipt, expenditure, and accounting of public money, and was to oversee the assessment of private property. The Department of Public Safety, in addition to the police and fire departments, was charged with health, charities, and relief. All public service corporations and franchises were the concern of the Department of Public Utilities. The Department of Public Property was charged with the upkeep and maintenance of streets, alleys, parks, playgrounds, and buildings. Excepted from the jurisdiction of this last department was the property of the Public Belt Railroad and certain other property administered by independent boards. In general, the commission council held all the powers formerly held by the city council plus those formerly held by the comptroller, the treasurer, the commissioner of public works and public buildings, and the city engineer.[34]

The new government included the principles of initiative and referendum. Any ordinance, according to the charter, might be brought before the commission on petition of a number of voters equivalent to 30 per cent of the electorate who voted in the previous election. The council then had the option of passing it or submitting it to the voters. A like percentage of the electorate could protest an ordinance for a ten-day period after its passage. After such protest, if the council did not repeal the ordinance, it was to be submitted to the voters.

The charter was passed by the legislature in July, 1912. On August 28, 1912, the electorate of the city ratified it by a considerable majority.[35]

Even though emanating from the Choctaw Club, the new charter was thought to be a boon to the reformers. It did change the form of the city administration and gave a more businesslike character to the official family, but in actual

[34]*Ibid.*

[35]New Orleans *Item,* August 29, 1912.

practice it did not weaken Behrman's power as mayor or boss. If fact, it allowed him to rely on the best non-machine assistance from the accomplishment of his plans without weakening his support from the machine. In the election following his first commission administration, Behrman had only token opposition,[36] and by 1917 was in an enviable political position. The council and the school board were extremely eager to follow his lead; the state administration was friendly to his administration; the Democratic national committeeman was in his political camp; and the newspapers were "apparently reconciled to his rule." The strong opposition of 1912, which had included most of the press, has "completely melted away." In the election of 1916 Behrman polled more votes in the city than President Wilson.[37]

In 1913 an article in the *National Municipal Review* praised the New Orleans commission plan and foresaw the end of the machine. In the article's claim that commissioners elected at large were free from ward politics,[38] there may have been a measure of truth. The charter did force the Choctaws to select able civic leaders and businessmen as candidates for the commission council; and some of the men so chosen proved to be creditable public servants.[39] The fact remained, however, that the commission government created by the 1912 charter was merely "superimposed upon the old structure of the former politicalized ward and councilmanic form."[40] Indeed, it increased the power of Martin Behrman over his organization, since ward leaders under the new plan had no seat or influence in the council and could only exert influence through their leader. The situation that made a boss not only possible but advisable—lack of integration in

[36]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 550.

[37]Ethel Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience under Commission Government," *National Municipal Review*, VI (1913), 73-79.

[38]*Ibid.* See also "New Orleans, A Commission City," *The Literary Digest*, XLV (September 14, 1912), 406.

[39]Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience under Commission Government," 73-79.

[40]*Administrative Survey of the Government of the City of New Orleans: Submitted by the Municipal Survey Commission* (New Orleans, 1922), 7.

governmental system—still remained in the commission form.[41]

Some paper work had been accomplished toward the building of a public belt railroad (a railroad switching service connecting industry and river wharves with trunk lines) before Behrman took office in 1904. The preceding city council had created the Public Belt Railroad Commission and had defined the right of way. Prominent businessmen had supported the plan, and J. E. Auvray and General Andrew Booth had organized a propaganda association to keep the subject before the public. But the plan had also been opposed as impracticable. Dominick C. O'Malley, editor of the New Orleans *Item*, had termed the plan "a vision before the entranced Mayor [Paul D. Capdevielle]." Municipal ownership had been to O'Malley but a "pleasant vagary."[42]

When Behrman took office he wanted to start work at once on the project but was hedged in on all sides with legal difficulties. Some of these he was able to dispose of without too much difficulty. The New Orleans and Northwestern and the Southern Pacific railroads were persuaded to withdraw their land and right-of-way claims. Since the railroads' city franchises were about to expire, they could see some wisdom in cooperating with the mayor. Another claim was held by E. H. Edenborn of the Louisiana Railway and Navigation Company. Edenborn started work on a spur line over the land he claimed, but his workers were arrested by order of Mayor Behrman. Edenborn's claim was based on a city ordinance of 1903 which had assigned him the right to lay tracks on the land in question, and he took the case to court. The civil district court ruled that the ordinance on which Edenborn based

[41]For an excellent short discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of commission government, see Chester C. Maxey, (ed.), *Readings in Municipal Government* (New York, 1924), 88-90. A discussion of the mayor's position under the commission form is ably presented in Zink, *Government of Cities in the United States,* 302-303.

[42]Kendall, *History of New Orleans,* II, 625; *Ordinances of the City of New Orleans, 1904,* No. 2685; Josephine Echezabal, "The History of the Orleans Public Belt Railroad" (M. A. Thesis, Tulane University, 1926), 49.

his claim was invalid, and on appeal the United States Supreme Court upheld the lower court.[43]

After construction began, a variety of vexatious interruptions and near-interruptions occurred, but the mayor was able to surmount each difficulty as it arose. To begin work on the Public Belt, $375,000 of the city reserve fund was used. This amount was soon exhausted and a work delay at an early stage was threatened, but Henry Schrieber, a wealthy merchant, put up money for tools and grading until new finance measures could be devised.[44] The next delay occurred because of a claim misunderstanding with the Illinois Central Railroad. A "strong-arm" squad employed by the Illinois Central met the city work gang between Calliope and Gainnie streets. This "goon" squad was armed with sledge hammers, shovels, and other tools, and refused to allow the city work gang to continue. Dan S. Lehon, strong-arm leader, whom Behrman called "Commander of the I. C. forces in the field," was thrown in jail, charged with "interfering with a municipality in the performance of its duty."[45] The Public Belt Commission and Illinois Central thereupon adjusted their differences. Editor Page Baker gave the credit chiefly to Behrman in his statement that "no member deserves . . . [the thanks of the community] more than Mayor Behrman."[46]

A money shortage again assailed the commission. Behrman, as president of the commission, secured an appropriation for $250,000, and work continued. He knew that this sum would not long suffice, and early in 1908 he secured permission to issue $2,000,000 in bonds. That year $1,400,000 worth of the bonds were sold, and $300,000 in bonds between 1915 and 1919 completed the financing of the road.[47]

[43]Behrman *v.* Louisiana Railway and Navigation Company (1910), 127 La. 775; Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item,* December 15, 1922.

[44]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item,* December 6, 1922.

[45]*Ibid.*

[46]New Orleans *Times-Democrat,* February 11, 1905.

[47]Kendall, *History of New Orleans,* II, 625. Authorization for issue of these bonds was proposed as a constitutional amendment by *Acts of Louisiana,* 1908, No. 179.

The first use of the tracks, a trial switch of an empty car, occurred on October 21, 1905. General operation did not start, however, until August 18, 1908. The opening of the road was the occasion of a gala ceremony. After the Governor and prominent business leaders of the city watched Mayor Behrman drive a golden spike in the last section of the track near the Harrison Street shed, Engineer J. E. Norton moved his engine forward for the first official trip.[48]

The operation of the road was successful from the beginning. In the year ending December 31, 1909, the line handled 82,065 cars at an average rate of $2.00 per car—a reduction of about $4.00 per car from the rates previously charged for the very limited service offered by private lines. The saving in time was even greater since the new municipal railroad offered twenty-four hour service as compared with the undependable service previously provided. By 1912 the road included eighteen miles of main line and ten miles of switches connecting with all public wharves and part of the privately owned wharves. Seven locomotives were in operation and the tally of cars switched for that year stood at 162,540. The debt incurred in building the road was 60 per cent paid, and the yearly revenue of the road was easily enough to pay both interest and installments on the principal.[49]

The road also was used for purposes other than revenue hauling. Especially constructed garbage cars were a major link in the garbage disposal system. Sand was hauled for building levees along the river front, and timber and steel were transported for use in repairing the public wharves and sheds.[50]

Martin Behrman's pride in the Public Belt Railroad was enormous. He always listed its construction among his major achievements and often carried on his person a report by

[48]New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, August 22, 1905.

[49]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 12-15; New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, *Monthly News Letter*, I (1951), unpaged.

[50]Louis A. Dodge, "The Public Belt Railroad of New Orleans," *The American City*, V (1911), 328-31.

United States Secretary of State Philander C. Knox that hailed New Orleans as the "most scientifically arranged port in the United States."[51]

Agitation for improvement in sewerage and water supply had begun before the beginning of the Behrman regime. Miss Kate Gordon, a prominent civic leader, had been active in the fight for improvement in these functions for many years. In the early days of Behrman's first administration she formed the Women's League for Sewerage and Drainage, the membership of which was estimated to be close to fifteen thousand. There was just cause for such agitation. As late as 1906 there were no sewers in New Orleans except those serving a few large buildings, and the vaults and cesspools in use in residential areas constituted a menace to the health of the community.[52] Water was furnished to a limited few by the city. The water was clear, but the city did little toward maintaining its purity.[53]

Behrman made the first step toward a new sewerage system in 1907, and by the end of the year sixteen thousand premises were served by the city sewerage lines.[54] By 1915, thirty thousand out of about seventy thousand premises were connected with the sewerage system.[55] In the spring of the same year the New Orleans Board of Health demanded public support for the Behrman solution of the city's long-standing sewerage problem, and on April 9 passed the following resolution:

> Whereas, the large numbers of open privy vaults and

[51]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, December 6, 1922.

[52]*Behrman Administration.* In the last part of the nineteenth century Baltimore and Mobile stood along with New Orleans as cities that still relied on open gutters for drainage. Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Rise of the City* (New York, 1933), 103.

[53]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 8; James J. McLaughlin, "Relation of the Municipality to the Water Supply," *The Annals of the American Academy of the Political and Social Sciences*, XXX (1907), 152-53.

[54]*Behrman Administration;* Mrs. John B. Parker and George C. Earl, "Water Purification and Drainage System of New Orleans," *The American City*, VI (1912), 884-86.

[55]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 10.

> cesspools in the city of New Orleans are a menace to the public health, and
>
> Whereas, the construction of most of the public sewers have reached a point sufficient to accommodate connection with premises in greater portions of the city; therefore, be it
>
> Resolved, that from and after the promulgation of this resolution it shall be unlawful for anyone to construct an open privy vault or cesspool on any premises within the city of New Orleans, providing the public sewers are available for connection.[56]

Behrman had found private bids on construction work too high for the city purse, and most of the laying of sewerage lines was accomplished by city work gangs from 1908 until 1914. By 1912 these gangs had built 154 miles of sewers at a cost of $1,151,000. Behrman offered evidence that the same construction performed by private contractors would have cost $750,000 more, but it was claimed in some quarters that the Mayor's use of city employees was chiefly a means of increasing the city payroll and thereby increasing the political power of the Choctaw Club. In 1914 Behrman petitioned the legislature for permission to continue the system, but the Governor killed the authorizing bill by a pocket veto. Thereafter the Sewerage and Water Board invited bids on labor but continued to purchase its own materials.[57]

The city water system had been operated since 1877 by a private corporation which held a monopoly grant. This corporation had evidently milked the franchise for all it was worth, and had provided the city with a bare minimum of service. The water supplied by the company came directly from the Mississippi River without benefit of filtration or settlement.[58]

In 1909 the new city waterworks began furnishing filtered, chemically pure water. The rates were about half of

[56]*Biennial Report of the Board of Health of the City of New Orleans,* 1912-1913, pp. 31, 32.

[57]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item,* December 16, 1922.

[58]McLaughlin, "Relation of the Municipality to the Water Supply," 152-53.

those formerly charged for crude river water. Between 1909 and 1912 the rates were twice lowered.[59] Regular faction campaigners in 1912 were happy to compare the New Orleans rates with the rates in New York, which were twice as high. In a letter to the Sewerage and Water Board even the hostile editor of the *Times-Democrat* admitted that "we get a splendid return for our money for the water services furnished by your department." The pressure of the new system was sixty-five pounds per square inch as contrasted with twenty pounds per square inch developed by the old system. The management of the waterworks met all current operating costs from the water rates and set aside all additional money in a "sinking and damage fund." In 1912 this fund amounted to $90,000.[60] The new waterworks furnished filtered, settled, and softened water to over fifty thousand premises by 1913, and by 1920 the city was almost completely served.[61]

By 1919 there existed more than 390 miles of drainage outlets, including subsurface drainage and 99.2 miles of canals. Of the total canal mileage, 46.9 miles were still open and unlined, 8.1 miles were wood-lined, and the remainder were masonry-lined and covered.[62]

All of the expansion of municipal services in connection with sewerage and water called for an accompanying expansion in the administrative offices of the Sewerage and Water Board. For a time offices were maintained in rented residence buildings convenient to the City Hall, but this arrangement proved unsatisfactory. In 1916 construction was started on the Sewerage and Water Board building on the corner of Carondelet and Lafayette streets. The city administration was assailed by the press for contracting for the structure at a time when construction prices were high. Behrman's defense was that office space was badly needed and would be needed even more at a later time when prices would be

[59]*Behrman Administration.*
[60]*Behrman Administration.*
[61]New Orleans *Item,* December 17, 1920.
[62]Dodd, *Report on the Health and Sanitary Survey,* 108-111.

still higher. Later, in his memoirs, he observed with some satisfaction that both the *Times-Democrat* and the *Item* had criticised him for expanding city facilities in 1916 but had themselves erected buildings in 1920 when prices were almost at their peak.[63]

Construction of much needed elementary schools was begun early in Behrman's first administration. Three buildings were added to the system in 1905-1906, and in 1907 more new schools made possible for the first time the enforcement of compulsory school attendance. In 1908 five schools were added, three in 1909, and one in 1910. Between 1911 and 1917 New Orleans opened twelve new buildings, including three high schools.[64] City officials and the school board could point in 1920 to a decided increase in facilities over those provided in 1904. There was an increase of 35 per cent in the number of schools, 100 per cent in the value of buildings and grounds. The increase in the number of pupils attending amounted to approximately 40 per cent.[65]

The salary of teachers was gradually raised from a minimum in 1904 of $315 per year to a minimum in 1920 of $800 per year. The salary average increased 166 per cent. These increases were made possible by an increase in annual public school appropriations from $500,000 in 1904 to $2,000,000 in 1920.[66]

[63]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, December 24, 1922.

[64]*Ibid.*, January 1, 1923.

[65]This figure, published by Behrman, may have been low. Education census reports estimate that percentage of attendance of school age children was 30.49 per cent in 1904. The total population of the city was 309,639. *Annual Report of the Department of the Interior: Commissioner of Education*, 1905, p. 448. By 1920 91.6 per cent of school age children in the 7-13 age group attended school. In the age group from 14-17 years 70.3 per cent attended school. The general population in 1920 was 387.219. United States Bureau of the Census *Fourteenth Census of the United States*, 1920: *Composition and Characteristics of the Population by States* (Washington, 1922), 43.

[66]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 560. According to the Snyder-Tucker Index of Living Costs, which uses 1913 as a base year with an index of 100, the index for 1904 was 66 and that for 1920 was 193. United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, 1949), 231. This indicates that the real wages of teachers had not greatly improved.

The increased appropriations made it possible for the school board to expand the curriculum to include manual training, domestic art, and domestic science. It also added departments of social hygiene and physical training and special departments for the blind, deaf, and dumb.[67] Improved lighting systems and stairways were installed, and corridors were remodeled or added so that fire exits were more accessible.[68] The board also paid increased attention to adult and trade school education. The evening school operating in 1904 was only one of twelve in 1920; and the board expanded the curricula of these schools to include social hygiene and physical training.[69]

By 1920 Behrman could boast that one in every three schools in the city had been built during his terms in office.[70] But with all the improvement it was not yet enough. The figures of the United States Bureau of the Census for the year ending June 30, 1918, listed the per capita expenditure of New Orleans at the bottom of a list of the cities with comparable population.[71]

For considerable improvement in the park system, Behrman and the city council shared honors with Mrs. A. J. Stallings, president of the Civic Improvement and Outdoor Art Association. Mrs. Stallings and the Association were chiefly instrumental in beginning thirteen new playgrounds between 1904 and 1920.[72] Parks other than playgrounds were established by the city government and the existing facilities were improved.[73] A parkway commission, created in 1909, established a city nursery on Gentilly Avenue for the cultivation of young trees. By 1913, 23,840 trees had been set out in

[67]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 360.

[68]McLaughlin, "Education Organization and Progress in American Cities," *op. cit.*, XXV (1903), 261-62.

[69]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, January 1, 1923.

[70]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 18.

[71]United States Bureau of the Census, *Financial Statistics of Cities Having a Population of Over 30,000, 1918*, (Washington, 1919), 224-229.

[72]Behrman, "Behrman Tells," New Orleans *Item*, December 26, 1922.

[73]New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, March 18, 1905.

parks, neutral grounds, and the area between sidewalks and streets.[74] Appropriations increased year by year, however, and in 1920 the value of grounds and equipment amounted to $490,000.[75]

A large part of this figure was the assessed valuation of West End Park—which Behrman created by outmaneuvering a transit company. Prior to 1905 the New Orleans Street Railway Company leased the area on the lakeside at the end of Pontchartrain Boulevard still known as West End. It was fitted out as an amusement park, and the company realized a profit from the operation of the amusement facilities and of a streetcar line to the area. The company's lease expired on January 27, 1905, and the property reverted to the city. The city, considering the property a white elephant, wished to renew the lease. Behrman asked the company to lease the property again but made a requirement that development in the area amounting to $225,000 be made by the company during the first ten years of its new tenure. The company refused. Behrman countered by threatening to lease the property to another transit company and to let the new company have a franchise for car lines to West End. He later retreated from this position and suggested instead that the company lend the city $175,000 to develop the area. The company would still have the transit business and the city would keep West End. The loan was to be paid back out of a percentage of the city's profits from the area. The bait was taken and the money changed hands. The city then converted West End from an amusement area into a park. Since there has been no profit from the park, no payment has been made.

The garbage "dispose-all" for New Orleans in the nineteenth century was the Mississippi River current. Householders packed garbage into boxes and barrels; city employees sporadically collected these containers and dumped them into

[74]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 356. Neutral ground is a term given to the planted areas in the middle of a street or boulevard. This area in other cities is often called parkway or traffic island.

[75]New Orleans *Item*, December 26, 1922.

the river; the current carried them away—in theory.[76] In fact, most of the filth stayed in the immediate vicinity long enough to pollute the water supply and bring another revolting odor to join those rising from the sewers and gutters. In 1900 attempts were made to bury the garbage in outlying areas of the city. Tidal overflows immediately reincarnated the all too substantial ghosts of last week's cabbage and yesterday's shrimp heads. The city fathers turned to fire, and tried burning huge piles of garbage in the open air. Every passing breeze reminded residents of New Orleans that the garbage disposal problem was still with them. During Behrman's first administration, he established a dump for garbage on Agriculture Street and used eighteen Public Belt Railroad cars to haul garbage to the dump from five receiving stations. Old canals and swamp lands were also employed as dumps.[77] Here hordes of rats, mice, flies, mosquitoes, and buzzards settled happily and obeyed the Biblical injunction to "be fruitful and multiply."

In 1918 an incinerator with a capacity of 36 tons each twenty-four hours began operation in Algiers. But this first major effort of the Behrman administration to solve the garbage disposal problem was also the last, for by 1926 the system had not improved.[78]

The average housewife bitterly critized the city's inability to solve the disposal problem, but refused to cooperate in garbage collection. An ordinance requiring citizens to retain garbage on the premises until time for collection was condemned by the press as in interference with the civil liberties of Orleanians. Attempts of the city to force individuals and commercial establishments to provide covered receptacles were denounced as "tyranny."[79]

[76]*Biennial Report of the Board of Health for the Parish of Orleans and City of New Orleans, 1890-1891*, pp. 115-116.

[77]Dodd, *Report on the Health and Sanitary Survey*, 112; Behrman, *Civic Development*, 22, 23.

[78]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 22, 23; Dodd, *Report on the Health and Sanitary Survey*, 112.

[79]New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, February 16, 1905.

An epidemic of bubonic plague in 1914 frightened the citizenry into a more cooperative spirit. An ordinance passed in that year prescribed the type of garbage cans to be used and stated what constituted garbage. Improved collection methods were established,[80] but evidently did not long continue. In 1920 the problem, still as far from solution as it had ever been, was continuing to provoke loud and vehement complaints.[81]

Street-cleaning, also a long-standing civic vexation, marked another failure of the Behrman regime. At the time Behrman took office, merchants of Canal Street found it necessary to provide their own street-cleaning service and taxed themselves to provide the service that was properly a city function.[82] The Behrman administration did improve street-cleaning to a limited extent and added considerably to the city's stock of street-cleaning equipment.[83] But the anti-administration charge that streets were still unsightly was only feebly refuted by the Choctaws in the campaign of 1920.[84]

Increased and improved street lighting during the Choctaw administrations was chiefly credited to Commissioner LaFaye, who began modernization of the system in 1915. By 1922 there were 5,626 arc lights in operation. Most of the increased lighting was allocated to the main thoroughfares, but the remote areas of the city remained poorly illuminated.[85]

Improvements in fire protection partially resulted from progress in other functions. The new waterworks and improved pumping machinery providing greater pressure over a larger area facilitated more effective fire-fighting. Dual machinery that was available by 1911 made it possible to

[80] *Ordinances of the City of New Orleans, 1914,* No. 2514.
[81] New Orleans *Times-Picayune,* August 28-September 7, 1920.
[82] New Orleans *Daily Picayune,* February 8, 1905.
[83] *Behrman Administration.*
[84] New Orleans *Times-Picayune,* August 28-September 7, 1920.
[85] Kendall, *History of New Orleans,* II, 556.

pump water directly from the Mississippi into the hydrant system, if the regular pumps became inoperative. Adoption of new construction codes restricted the hazard of buildings that were highly susceptible to fire. And more paved streets made possible greater speed in moving equipment to the scene of a fire.[86]

Within the fire department itself significant changes were made. Discipline and organization reached a higher point of efficiency; superannuated firemen were retired to make way for younger, more able men. The results of both the direct and collateral improvements were evident by 1911. In that year the fire department answered 576 alarms. Five hundred and sixteen of the fires reported were confined to the buildings in which they originated; twenty-one were false alarms; and seventeen were unnecessary calls.[87]

By 1919, five thousand hydrants were available along six hundred miles of street, and average pressure along the route was sixty pounds. The Behrman administration erected twenty-seven engine houses at a cost of $370,255 and increased the personnel of the department, but complete modernization was not completed by the end of Behrman's fourth term. In 1920 there were still twenty-five horse-drawn hook-and-ladder trucks in service.[88]

In the era of Choctaw ascendancy, business was the subject of national veneration, the businessman the pillar of any community. Martin Behrman was entirely cognizant of the general feeling and maintained the most cordial relationships with the New Orleans business community. He was a member of many businessmen's clubs; he was vice-president of a local bank.[89] The Chamber of Commerce requested that he write a pamphlet for them;[90] and he was invited to speak

[86]Louis A. Dodge, "Improved Fire Protection in New Orleans," *The American City*, VI (1912), 668-70.

[87]*Ibid.*

[88]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 556.

[89]*Who's Who in Louisiana and Mississippi*, 20-21.

[90]Behrman, *Civic Development*, title page. See also "Advancement in New Orleans," *The Logical Point*, I (1910), 5-7.

before the Society of Economics at Tulane University.[91] One businessman of a large national firm attested that Behrman was far easier and more pleasant to deal with than any of the mayors he had seen and dealt with all over the United States.[92] After the commission form of government became effective, Behrman relied to an even greater extent on business leaders and chose them as his running mates for the city commission. Relations were most cordial. In fact, there is some evidence that they were perhaps too cordial.

The machine and its leaders on many occasions ranged themselves on the side of New Orleans public utility companies. Choctaw legislators opposed legislation that would have transferred utility taxes from the city to state. Of course, they plead the cause of city interest, but the fact that the utility companies also opposed the legislation indicates that they expected better treatment from the city than from the state.[93] On another occasion the Choctaw delegation to the legislature joined the utility companies in opposing a bill which would have established a state public utility commission.[94]

Behrman sometimes felt it necessary to communicate business sentiments on projected legislation to Regular representatives at Baton Rouge. In connection with an anti-monopoly bill he gave the Regular delegates the "green light." "Local commercial interests," he reported, "have made no effort apparently to show that the anti-trust bills are objectionable to them, so the representatives of the city organization will vote for the passage of the bill."[95]

The machine may well be charged with irregular business relations of another sort. Political friends of Martin

[91]Martin Behrman, *Address Before the Society of Economics, Tulane University, January 14, 1913* (n. p., n.d.).

[92]New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, March 24, 1905.

[93]*Ibid.*, August 23, 1912.

[94]George M. Reynolds, *Machine Politics in New Orleans* (New York, 1936), 148.

[95]Quoted in *ibid.*

Behrman, often happy owners of property valued for taxes at a conveniently low figure, were afforded a business advantage over non-Regular competitors.[96]

Relatives of the Chief also seemed to thrive and prosper. Those who were closely associated in business with the mayor's son had phenomenal luck in securing municipal contracts. The story of one of these contracts is particularly rich in what lawyers call circumstantial evidence. The chain of circumstances began when Hampton Reynolds, business associate of Stanley Behrman, was awarded a contract for construction of two sections of protection levee by the Orleans Levee Board, an organization graced by Martin Behrman as an ex-officio member. The original amount of the contract was $64,540, but this was increased to $220,780 after the contract was awarded. No change was made as to the amount of construction required. Reynolds' original bid was much lower than that of the next competitor. Had Reynolds gambled on an increase of the original stipulated amount? Or is it possible that he had some inkling of what the future held?[97] The New Orleans *American* cited similar chains of circumstances involving the same cast of characters.[98]

On the other hand, Behrman often opposed business interests when they were obviously in opposition to the public welfare. One of his first acts after assuming office in his first administration was to collect $10,000 due the city from the New Orleans Railway Company since 1880 as the result of a forfeited contract.[99] In the face of opposition from business interest he also spoke in favor of state-owned rice warehouses. To save the city money on private bids, he built the municipal asphalt repair plant, and in 1915 threatened to build a municipal power plant if the New Orleans Light and Power Company did not lower rates.[100] Other examples of

[96]New Orleans *Item*, September 11, 1920.
[97]New Orleans *American*, February 7, 1917.
[98]*Ibid.*, February 7-9.
[99]New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, April 13, 1905.
[100]Reynolds, *Machine Politics in New Orleans*, 153.

such notions were his efforts to secure interest on public funds, the "loan" maneuvered for West End park, and the use of city work gangs for sewerage construction.

Martin Behrman had an almost naive faith in businessmen's abilities in civic endeavors. Businessmen were usually welcome in the city government. He realized that expert knowledge "was an absolute essential condition of excellence in public administration."[101] His philosophy of government calling for the politician "on top" and the expert "on tap" is today an accepted principle of many political scientists in the field of public administration.

The extensive civic development during the Behrman administration provided jobs for many laborers and contracts for New Orleans firms. Some of his opponents naturally saw a political purpose in most of the program, but criticism of this nature was a great deal less than might have been expected. One factor that may have forestalled such criticisms was that much of the program was closely attuned to the industrial and commercial activity of the city and accompanied a greater period of development in these fields than any since the Civil War. Then, too, Behrman gave his opposition few opportunities to charge that his program was unnecessary. Most construction and change was not "made work" but was in answer to long-existing needs.

On the other hand, valid grounds for two adverse criticisms existed. The administration did not succeed to any marked extent in providing clean streets; and it failed miserably to develop an effective method of garbage collection. But these failures were insignificant when compared to the over-all improvements. Large parts of the city were made habitable by extension of sewerage and water service; children were provided with more adequate schools; and business was given a boost by the building of the Public Belt Railroad and by the general public progress. Moreover, between

[101]Behrman, *Civic Development*, 3.

1904 and 1920 the assessment value of New Orleans property rose from $158,584,194 to $485,428,713.[102]

These figures and the accomplishments definitely accredited to Behrman indicate that he played an important role in lifting the city from the economic and civic morass in which it had floundered since carpetbag days.

[102]Kendall, *History of New Orleans*, II, 555. The tax rate for the period was 2.55 mills on the dollar. Up to 1917 assessment for taxation was on a 100 per cent basis. In 1918 and 1919 the rate was cut to 75 per cent but raised to 90 per cent in 1920. Much of the increased valuation resulted from the Behrman-sponsored reclamation of land fronting Lake Pontchartrain. *Ibid.*

The Seizure of the Forts and Public Property in Louisiana

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ON A HOT WEDNESDAY afternoon in New Orleans, seventeen days before Louisiana withdrew from the Union, Brigadier General Elisha L. Tracy summoned his junior officers to an important conference. At this time, Tracy commanded the 1st Brigade, Louisiana State Troops. By 8 p. m., the militia captains had assembled and reported their troops equipped and ready to march.

An air of excitement filled the air. The soldiers inquired of one another as to the purpose of the sudden muster. Soon the news was out. The public property belonging to the Federal government in Louisiana was to be seized. Among the properties designated to be appropriated by the state were the United States arsenal and barracks at Baton Rouge; Forts Jackson and Saint Philip on the Mississippi River, seventy miles below New Orleans; Fort Livingston, guarding the entrance to Barataria Bay; Fort Pike on the Rigolets; and Fort Macomb on Chef Menteur. Here was the initial whisper of war. All this before the convention, with secession on its mind, had yet assembled.[1]

The arsenal and barracks at Baton Rouge caused Louisiana's chief executive, Governor Thomas O. Moore, considerable worry. These symbols of Federal power were located near the state capitol, where the delegates of the sovereign

[1] John Dimitry, *Confederate Military History* (Atlanta, 1899), 20.

people of his state were about to assemble. Moore was afraid that these bases, if held by hostile and unscrupulous individuals, might be used to overawe and restrain the deliberations of the convention. Upon his own responsibility, the governor had resolved to take possession of all the military posts and munitions of war within his state.[2]

Major General John L. Lewis, the commander of the 1st Division, Louisiana Militia was ordered by Governor Moore on January 6 to have a force of 300 men ready to move on an hour's notice. It was to implement this order that General Tracy, three days later, mustered his men at the foot of Levee and Canal Streets. Captain James B. Walton of the Washington Artillery was placed in command of the expedition. Walton's force was assigned the mission of capturing the United States arsenal and barracks at Baton Rouge. Twenty rounds of ammunition were issued to each of the 250 men present. By midnight the troops had boarded the steamer *National*.[3]

"Task Force Walton" disembarked the next morning at Baton Rouge. Upon going ashore, Walton's troops rendezvoused with militia units from the capital city. Thus augmented, the Louisianians, now numbering some 600 strong, proceeded to the arsenal and barracks, which they surrounded.[4]

At 5 p. m., two of Governor Moore's aides-de-camp, Colonels Richard Taylor and Braxton Bragg, advanced under a flag of truce. Knocking on the gate of the arsenal, the two officers delivered to Captain Joseph A. Haskin, the commanding officer of the barracks, an ultimatum from the governor. This document read:

[2] *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Vol. I, 495. (Hereinafter cited as *O. R.*)

[3] *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. LIII, 610. The militia companies which constituted Walton's task force were: 1st Company, Foot Rifles; 2d Company, Foot Rifles; Lafayette Company, Number 2—all belonging to the Louisiana Legion. Those belonging to the 1st Brigade were: Washington Artillery, Louisiana Grays, Sarsfield Rifles, Louisiana Guards, Orleans Cadets, and the Crescent Rifles.

[4] *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. I, 490.

> The safety of the State of Louisiana demands that I take possession of all Government property within her limits. You are, therefore, summoned hereby to deliver up the barracks, arsenal, and public property now under your command.
>
> With the large force at my disposal this demand will be enforced. Any attempt at defense on your part will be a rash sacrifice of life.[5]

Anticipating no reinforcements or support, and confronted by overwhelming odds, Haskin deemed it proper, after consulting with his subordinate officers, to surrender to the state authorities.[6]

Articles of capitulation were drawn up and signed, providing for the surrender "of the barracks, arsenal, and all public property therein, to the State of Louisiana, receipts to be given by Governor Moore for the same". It was provided that Haskin's small command, composed of officers and enlisted men belonging to Company D, 1st United States Artillery, would be placed aboard boats and sent up the river. The troops were to be permitted to take with them "their personal effects, infantry armanent, camp and garrison equipage, and twenty days' rations. . . ."[7]

One immediate advantage accrued to the Louisiana authorities with the capture of the arsenal. Previously, the state had been faced with a critical shortage of firearms. Now the

[5] *Ibid.* Richard Taylor, only son of the twelfth President of the United States, was born near Louisville, Kentucky, on January 27, 1826. He was educated abroad and at Yale, from which he graduated in 1845. During the Mexican War, he served as his father's secretary. During the post-war period, he lived upon his extensive estate in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, and devoted himself to the management of the plantation. Taylor served in the state senate from 1856 to 1861. He was a delegate to the Charleston and Baltimore Democratic Conventions in 1860.

Joseph A. Haskin was born in New York, and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1839. Serving in the Mexican War, Haskin was breveted twice for meritorious service and gallantry. He had been promoted to a captain in the 1st Artillery on February 22, 1851.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*

state was so well supplied that Governor Moore was able to send to Governor John J. Pettus of Mississippi: 5,000 flintlock muskets, 3,000 percussion muskets, 1,000 Hall's rifles, 200,000 cartridges (buck and ball), 1,000 pounds of rifle powder, six 24-pounder guns and carriages, 500 24-pounder shot, and 1,000 pounds of cannon powder.[8]

On the same day that the Pelican flag was hoisted over the barracks at Baton Rouge, a second detachment, mustering 166 officers and men, had assembled at the state arsenal in New Orleans. This force was commanded by Major Paul E. Théard.[9] In response to a telegraphic warning from Senators Judah P. Benjamin and John Slidell in Washington that a secret attempt would be made by the Gulf Squadron to pour reinforcements into the coastal forts, Governor Moore decided that Théard's command should proceed against Forts Jackson and Saint Philip.[10] From the arsenal, the troops marched to the quay. There, they boarded the steamboat *Yankee.*

Arriving next morning before the two forts, which were on opposite sides of the Mississippi, seventy miles below New Orleans, Major Théard demanded their surrender. At this time, the forts were not garrisoned. Captain Henry St. Paul took possession of Fort Saint Philip, which was unoccupied, while Major Théard received the surrender of Fort Jackson from Ordnance Sergeant H. Smith, its caretaker. Over these twin strong points which guarded the Mississippi River approaches to the "Crescent City", the Pelican flag was quickly hoisted.[11]

A third expeditionary force commanded by Captain George

[8] *Ibid.*, 495. Major Josiah Gorgas, Chief of Confederate Ordnance, reported to the state authorities that by their seizure of the Baton Rouge arsenal they had gained possession of the following types of arms: 4,236 rifles, 29,222 percussion type muskets, 8,283 flintlocks, 73 Colt rifles, 2,287 Hall rifles, 735 carbines, 2,075 percussion pistols, and 468 Colt pistols.

[9] *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. LIII, 610. Théard's force consisted of a company of Jaegers, and the Chasseurs, 1814 and 1815.

[10] *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. I, 496.

[11] *Ibid.*, 491.

Clark had assembled at the armory of the Continental Guards on January 10, Clark's men moved to the landing on Lake Ponchartrain, where they boarded the Mobile mail packet. On January 14, the Louisianians disembarked at the Rigolets. Over the hearty protests of its ordnance sergeant tenant, they seized Fort Pike.[12] In addition, the state authorities had also occupied the defenses of Proctor's Landing, Battery Bienvenue, and Tower Dupré. These three fortifications covered the approaches to New Orleans from Lake Borgne.

It would require a vast amount of labor to place in a defensible condition these fortifications which the Louisiana state troops had seized during the second week of January. Colonel Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers in the United States Army, had noted in his report to Congress in 1860 that in case of war the forts should be manned by the following complements: Fort Saint Philip 600 men, Fort Pike 300 men, Battery Bienvenue 100 men, Tower Dupré 50 men, Fort Jackson 600 men, and the defenses of Proctor's Landing 100 men.[13] In securing personnel to garrison the forts, Governor Moore would be aided by a board of military commissioners. The special session of the legislature had authorized the enrollment of 500 men for four months' service. Following the occupation of the forts, these volunteers were rapidly organized into the 1st Louisiana Regular Regiment.[14] As quickly as possible, the regulars were sent out. They were used to relieve the militiamen of the responsibility for garrisoning the forts.[15]

On January 23, the convention which was to decide the fate of Louisiana assembled at Baton Rouge. The delegates had for their guidance the vote of the popular referendum. The people believing in unilateral action by the state had carried the election against the individuals who favored withdrawal in conjunction with other Southern states, by a vote

12 Dimitry, *Confederate Military History*, 21.
13 *O. R.*, Series III, Vol. I, 48.
14 Dimitry, *Confederate Military History*, 22.
15 *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. LIII, 612-14.

of 4,258 to 3,978.[16] Governor Moore, through his seizure of the Federal properties within the state, had all but presented the convention with a *fait accompli.* Three days later on January 26 the delegates, by a vote of 113 ayes to 17 nays, proceeded to adopt, "An Ordinance to dissolve the union between the State of Louisiana and other States united with her, under the compact entitled 'The Constitution of the United States.' "[17] Seven of the seventeen who had voted in the negative immediately signed the Ordinance.[18] As soon as the votes had been tabulated, Mouton announced, "the connection of Louisiana with the United States is dissolved, and the Federal authority therein null and void."[19]

When the announcement of the passage of the Ordinance of Secession was made in New Orleans, several Federal officers immediately resigned their positions. Governor Moore, acting through Maurice Grivot, Adjutant General of Louisiana, moved to sequester the remaining Federal property in the state. To implement the governor's instructions, Captain Henry A. Clinch, accompanied by a detachment of the 1st Louisiana Regulars, moved against Fort Macomb. On January 28, Ordnance Sergeant D. Wilber surrendered Fort Macomb to Captain Clinch's command.[20]

On the same day, Adjutant Grivot called on Lieutenant Colonel Abraham C. Myers and demanded, "possession of all the quartermaster's commissary stores, and of all property under your control and in your possession belonging to the United States of America, for which the State of Louisiana is and will be accountable. . . ."[21] Myers complied with

16 Dimitry, *Confederate Military History,* 23.

17 *O. R.,* Series I ,Vol. LIII, 616.

18 Carl R. Fish, *The American Civil War* (New York, 1937), 54.

19 Dimitry, *Confederate Military History,* 25.

20 *O. R.,* Series I, Vol. LIII, 616; *O. R.,* Series I, Vol. I, 492.

21 *O. R.,* Series I, Vol. I, 493. Abraham C. Myers, the first Quartermaster General of the Confederate States, was a native of South Carolina, but a citizen of Louisiana by adoption. Myers was graduated from West Point in 1833 and served in the Mexican War. In 1860, he held a position in the Quartermaster Department of the United States Army, with the rank of brevet lieutenant colonel, and was stationed at New Orleans.

Grivot's request, and notified Adjutant General Samuel Cooper:

> I will forward receipts to the proper staff departments of the U. S. Army at Washington for all public property in my custody for which I am accountable, and the public funds in my hands I will turn over to the assistant treasurer of the United States in New Orleans. . . .
>
> South Carolina, the State where I was born, and Louisiana, the State of my adoption, having in convention passed ordinances of secession from the United States, I am absolved from my allegiance to the Federal Government. My resignation as an officer of the U. S. Army is accepted for me by the States above named. I beg that the settlement of my accounts will be made up as soon as possible. I shall make it a point of honor scrupulously to discharge every item of accountability arising from any differences in the official statements and my own in connection with my duties while I was in the Army of the United States.[22]

Secretary of War Joseph Holt was deeply stung by Myers' action in surrendering to the Louisiana authorities the stores entrusted to his keeping. He dashed off a letter to Governor Moore, protesting the forced requisition of the quartermaster and commissary stores.

> Their seizure, under the circumstances, was an act of flagrant and atrocious spoliation, which I can scarcely believe had the sanction of a government professing to be organized for the maintenance of law and order, and to be regulated by those principles of justice and morality which are inseparable from the civilization of the age.[23]

Now a man who was destined to be Louisiana's most noted native military figure in the course of the impending conflict entered upon the scene. Major Pierre G. T. Beauregard, who had been removed as superintendent of the United States Military Academy on January 28, returned to New Orleans

[22] *Ibid.*, 492-93.
[23] *Ibid.*, 500.

in the second week of February.[24] Hardly had the major set foot in the "Crescent City" before he began to issue a stream of advice to the state military authorities. An able engineer, Beauregard observed that the defenses of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip were in such deplorable condition that any steamer could pass them in broad daylight. He expounded his thesis that, even when properly defended, the forts could not prevent the passage of one or more steamers during a dark or stormy night; except with the assistance of a "properly constructed" raft, or a strong "wire-rope", stretched across the river between the two forts, so as to arrest the steamers' progress.[25]

As the initial step in strengthening the "Crescent City" defenses, Beauregard recommended the construction of a barrier across the river. Next, he suggested that the number of heavy guns bearing on the river should be greatly augmented. He proposed that all heavy ordnance, not required for the defense of Baton Rouge, Forts Pike and Macomb, and Battery Bienvenue, should be transferred to Forts Jackson and Saint Philip. His final suggestion encompassed the felling of the numerous trees which masked the fire of the twin forts. In summing up, Beauregard commented:

> In a few words, no expenses ought to be spared to put those two works in a most efficient state of defense, for fifty thousand or a hundred thousand dollars spent thus might, a few weeks hence, save millions of dollars to the State and the City of New Orleans.[26]

In accordance with Beauregard's suggestions, Colonel Paul O. Hébert, Chief of Artillery and Engineers in the Louisiana State Army on February 22 ordered the transfer of the following types of heavy ordnance to the forts guarding the Mississippi below New Orleans: Fifteen 24-pounder siege guns *en barbette* with carriages from Fort Macomb to Fort

[24] T. Harry Williams, *P. G. T. Beauregard, Napoleon in Gray* (Baton Rouge, 1955), 44-47.

[25] *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. I, 500.

[26] *Ibid.*, 501.

St. Philip, ten 24-pounder siege guns with carriages from Battery Bienvenue to Fort St. Philip, and nine 24-pounder siege guns from Baton Rouge to Fort St. Philip. To expedite the delivery of these weapons, Hébert recommended that the guns be placed aboard a steamboat. This vessel would proceed to the designated fort by way of the Rigolets and Pass à l'Outre.[27]

In Louisiana, secession had now run its course. The state had severed its ties with the national government and had seized all Federal properties within its boundaries. Colonel Bragg, the governor's *aide-de-camp*, had been placed in charge of the state army. Delegates had been sent to the convention which had assembled at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4 to hammer out an instrument of government for the seceding states. Within two weeks, a provisional government had been established; a president and vice president inaugurated.

[27] *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. LIII, 618-19.

Discontent in Confederate Louisiana

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ENTHUSIASM RAN HIGH in Louisiana during the first year of the war. Even those who had opposed secession seemed to be carried along on the wave of patriotism that swept over the state. Two weeks after Lincoln's call for troops, a resident of New Orleans wrote: "There is no division among the people here. There is but one mind, one heart, one action. . . . Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet have made them of one mind."[1] Yet by August some discontent[2] became apparent in the state. The *Shreveport Southwestern* reported that a mass meeting was held in Winnfield on August 24 "for the purpose of devising some means by which men of the parish who are able and not willing to support the volunteers can be reached."[3]

During the first few months after the fall of Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops in 1861, the state was probably nearer unanimity than at any other time. As the Confederate

[1]Mrs. Randall Hunt, "Letters to Secretary Chase from the South," *American Historical Review*, IV (January, 1889), 339.

[2]In this study "discontent" refers to any failure to cooperate with the Confederate government, passive or active opposition and discord. It also includes discontent among officials who were generally in sympathy with the aims of the Confederacy but opposed the way the war was conducted.

[3]Jefferson Davis Bragg, *Louisiana in the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge, 1941), 62 n.

government called for troops, Louisiana willingly equipped and sent its quota to Northern Virginia and Tennessee. By November, 1861, there were 23,577 troops from Louisiana in Confederate service.[4] This number compares favorably with that from other states. A Richmond editor noted that "the Pelicans have done better in proportion to their population than any other Confederate state outside Virginia."[5]

As the first year of the war drew to a close, zeal and patriotism began to decline both at home and in the army. Hardships and military defeats bred discontent among the people, not only in Louisiana, but elsewhere in the Confederacy, and discontent lowered morale. Declining morale led to disloyalty to the Confederacy, which the *Picayune* condemned in an editorial, "Domestic Traitors". The editor warned of the existence of a few disloyal persons in the Confederacy, adding that their "insignificance in numbers . . . has been their protection."[6]

As early as April, 1862, the adjutant general in New Orleans reported to Governor Thomas O. Moore and to Richmond that he had information concerning "secret meetings of disloyal men in the parishes of Natchitoches and Sabine, and that societies and clubs exist composed of citizens of those parishes." According to this report, these men "assert a desire to restore the Union and commit sundry other acts of disloyalty and disaffection to the present Government." In May, Governor Moore sent a message to President Davis requesting authority to declare martial law in any parish in which he thought it necessary. "Traitors have sprung up on Red River. . . . In my own parish [Rapides] and Natchitoches and Avoyelles are places where it is wanted at present." Davis granted the request: "Proclaim in my name suspension of

[4]U. S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols. in 128, Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. 4, Vol. I, 135, 211, 221, 747. (Hereinafter cited as *O. R.*)

[5]Reprinted in New Orleans *Daily Picayune*, August 23, 1861.

[6]*Ibid.*, March 12, 1862.

writ of *habeas corpus* in Rapides, Avoyelles, and Natchitoches parishes."[7]

Southern parishes also suffered a decline in morale. This came at the time the Confederacy was meeting a number of military reverses. In the East Federals took Port Royal Harbor in South Carolina, Fort Pulaski in Georgia, and Pensacola in Florida. In the West the Confederacy suffered defeats at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Nashville in February, 1862; at Shiloh and New Orleans in April; and at Memphis and Pea Ridge, Arkansas, in June.

More than the other defeats, the people of Louisiana felt the loss of New Orleans, the pride of the state as well as the center of trade. It was the largest city in the South and sixth largest in the nation. About a month after that city went under Federal control, Governor Moore wrote President Davis that the "shock experienced by the fall of New Orleans was deadening. Our people are appalled." He added that the part of Louisiana which was not under Federal occupation was a "prey to internal dissensions and the perils of demoralization produced by the disorganized condition of Confederate forces." A later message stated that "these distresses have disheartened some of our citizens and demoralized others. . . . Dormant disloyalty has awakened with the disasters . . . and the murmurs of the suffering mingle with the complaints of the mercenary . . . and the whispered tones of treason." Davis replied that he hoped "the disaffection to which you allude will . . . prove to be very limited in extent. The commanding general will be authorized to adopt appropriate measures for its suppression." General Richard Taylor, who was placed in command of troops in Confederate Louisiana on July 28, 1862, noted the low morale of the people and later wrote: "I addressed myself to the heavy task of arousing public sentiment, apathetic, if not hostile from disaster and neglect."[8]

[7]*O. R.*, Ser. 2, Vol. II, 1422; Ser. I, Vol. LIII, 807; Vol. XV, 740, 754.
[8]*Ibid.*, Ser. I, Vol. LIII, 740, 748; Vol. XV, 767; Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Late War* (New York, 1879), 103.

In an effort to allay the fears of the people of his state, Moore addressed them on June 18, 1862, from Opelousas, which had become the capital after New Orleans fell. After praising the people for their loyalty, he warned of "tories" in the state. "Although few in number," he said, "they exist . . . and can be tolerated no longer . . . the doubtful must be watched, the disloyal must be imprisoned, and when found guilty of treason, must be held to the penalty due that capital crime."[9]

With military disasters in 1862, came the longing for peace. No doubt, the editor of the *Picayune* expressed the wish of many Louisianians in October, 1862, when he wrote:

> We believe that all parties . . . are really sick of this unnatural strife and long to have it ended. Can it not be effected? Is the mountainous heap of the dead not yet high enough? . . . Half the land is in mourning. Shall the funereal gloom cover it entirely?
>
> What hinders them from negotiating now as well as a year, or two years, or a half dozen years hence? We believe that if the question of peace upon fair terms were proposed to the soldiers of the armies, the vote for peace would be all but unanimous. . . .
>
> The great majority of men, we feel sure, North and South, are reasoning persons, who can have no interest and no desire to afflict each other unnecessarily. They would heartily welcome any honest effort to bring this terrible destructive contest to an early and honorable termination.[10]

At the same time that military reverses of 1862 lowered the morale of the people and encouraged disaffection and disloyalty, various acts of the Confederate Congress brought forth a storm of opposition. Chief among these were laws which provided for: conscription, impressment, collection of a tax-in-kind, and restrictions on trade.

[9]Thomas O. Moore, "Address to the People of Louisiana," June 18, 1862, in Moore (Thomas O.) Papers (Department of Archives, Louisiana State University).

[10]*Daily Picayune,* October 19, 1862.

The conscription act was passed on April 16, 1862. As enthusiasm for the war had waned, volunteering had declined. Men whose one-year terms were expiring were going home, and Congress realized it must act. It declared every able-bodied white man between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five subject to military service for three years. Men could volunteer for three years if they did not want to be conscripted. The act allowed conscripts to hire as substitutes able-bodied men not of conscript age. The law allowed certain exemptions. Davis urged conscription because he felt that it would build a co-ordinated military machine, distribute the burdens of war more evenly, and insure longer terms of service. Later he expressed the opinion that the law "was not popular anywhere outside the army."[11] In fact, it was unpopular with many men in the army, especially those whose one-year terms were ending and who were looking forward to going home. Others opposed it on the principle that men forced into service would be of little value. A Louisiana volunteer said that the men in his regiment "emphatically declared that they would serve any length of time as volunteers, but that they would never serve in the degraded position of a conscript." They rejoiced, however, over the idea that it would bring into service "those political loafers who had been such rabid secessionists . . . before the war . . . but who had never entered the army."[12]

In civilian life much of the opposition to conscription came from men who felt no interest in the war and did not want to serve. Kate Stone, daughter of a wealthy planter of Madison Parish, wrote in her diary in May, 1862:

> The conscription law has caused commotion and consternation among the shirking stay-at-homes. Around here many are deluding themselves with the belief that the call will not be enforced in Louisiana now that New Orleans has fallen

[11]Albert Burton Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* (New York, 1924), 12-15; *O. R.*, Ser. 4, Vol. I, 1097-98; Vol. II, 154; James D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* (2 vols., Nashville, 1905), I, 206.

[12]William Watson, *Life in the Confederate Army* (New York, 1888), 347, 349.

> and Vicksburg is threatened. Not a single man has joined for the past two months.[13]

Congress passed several exemption acts which offered to many men an opportunity to escape conscription. Exemptions were granted to those who followed certain vital occupations, such as teaching, pharmacy, ministry, salt making, and manufacturing army supplies. These vocations became popular. The law to which the poorer people especially objected was that providing exemption from military service each white man who owned at least twenty slaves and worked them on a plantation. Most of the free people of Louisiana owned no slaves in 1860. Of the 20,670 slave-holders, about 90 per cent had fewer than twenty slaves each.[14]

These people resented the law, which they felt placed an unfair burden on them. A group of them sent a petition to Governor Moore in December, 1862, in which they complained that conscription had left but five "efficient men to assist the sick, the afflicted and the poor families in our midst." They explained that they were destitute of corn and meat and requested a delay in conscripting men in their community. Most of the signatures were mere "X's". General Richard Taylor granted permission, at the governor's request, for these men to stay at home for thirty days to provide for their families.[15]

Allowance for hiring substitutes also caused dissatisfaction among the poorer people who could not afford them. As the war progressed, the price for substitutes rose from twenty dollars to as much as $5,000. This feature of the conscription law was one cause for the use of the slogan, "the rich man's war and the poor man's fight."[16]

[13]John Q. Anderson (ed.), *Brokenburn, the Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868* (Baton Rouge, 1955), 103.

[14]Garnie W. McGinty, *A History of Louisiana* (New York, 1949), 184-85; Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy*, 75.

[15]"Petition from Citizens of Staley's Precinct, Rapides Parish, to Governor Thomas O. Moore," December 1, 1862, in Moore Papers; General Richard Taylor to Governor Moore, December 1, 1862, *ibid.*

[16]Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy*, 51.

Much of the disapproval of the conscription laws stemmed from the fact that they were the first laws of their kind in American history. Conscription in the North, which began in March, 1863, was opposed even more bitterly than in the Confederacy. Riots occurred in New York and elsewhere. The *Picayune* reprinted a news item from the *New York World* of July 14, 1863, which told of "a most formidable and widely extended riot," which lasted two days and cost many lives.[17]

From the outset, evasion of the conscription law became widespread in Louisiana as elsewhere in the Confederacy. General Taylor reported to Richmond in November, 1862, that he met difficulty in executing the law, especially in the river parishes from New Orleans to the Sabine River. In many instances he found it necessary to "scour the country with cavalry in order to bring conscripts to camps of instruction."[18]

As the war continued, conscription became even harder to enforce. By 1863, Taylor reported that the "number of conscripts recently brought to camp is small and these have to be hunted down . . . and brought in tied and sometimes in irons." In February, 1864, he reported that the conscript law "had practically become a dead letter in the Attakapa area" —St. Landry, Lafayette, and St. Martin parishes—because of the "universal hostility of the people." The fact that so few in that region spoke English "made it hard to appeal to their feelings of patriotism."[19]

Further discontent in Louisiana was caused by the impressment act, passed in March, 1863. The purpose of this law was to force farmers and merchants to sell their produce at "reasonable" prices. Commissary and quartermaster officers, who made all impressments had the final decision as to what prices were "reasonable."[20]

[17] *Daily Picayune*, July 28, 1863.
[18] *O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XV, 872.
[19] *Ibid.*, Vol. LIII, 807; Vol. XXXIV, Part 2, p. 937.
[20] *Ibid.*, Ser. 4, Vol. II, 469-72.

The price-fixing feature of the law aroused bitterness because prices were set below market prices. Complaints came to the governor concerning the "grossly illegal manner" in which Confederate officials made impressments. General E. Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department, wrote to Richmond that the act had "spread discontent and dissatisfaction" among the people. Governor Moore called the law "most unwise" and advocated its repeal. Governor Henry W. Allen, his successor, complained of abuses in the "arbitrary execution" of the act and of the hardships resulting from it. Further evidence of the widespread dissatisfaction is indicated in a report of a Confederate official to Richmond in January, 1864:

> Great dissatisfaction prevailed in many sections, and generally among the masses. . . . Most of the feeling is caused by general disregard of all law or sanctity of private rights by the officers and men of our army. . . . In some localities all the cattle, hogs, and corn of farmers have been taken, and teams are not left to make a crop. Under this pressure the people have become, if not disloyal, at least indifferent . . . to the cause.[21]

Farmers of the state were also displeased with the act of Congress which taxed them one tenth of their farm produce. Collection was made in kind. This act, passed in April, 1863, was advocated as the best method of provisioning the army without printing money. It met opposition generally because it was not uniformly collected and because of the dishonesty of quartermaster agents. Small farmers, who had no resources but their crops, felt they were being oppressed. This was another cause of the prevalent saying that it was "the rich man's war and the poor man's fight."[22]

The Confederate Congress also aroused opposition in Lou-

[21]Sarah A. Dorsey, *Recollections of Henry Watkins Allen* (New York, 1866), 246; *O. R.*, Ser. 4, Vol. II, 469, 876, 1008; Vol. III, 398; Vol. XXXIV, 921-22; Vol. XL, 1381.

[22]E. Merton Coulter, *The Confederate States of America* (Baton Rouge, 1950), 178-81; Nathaniel W. Stephenson, *The Day of the Confederacy* (New Haven, 1919), 81; *O. R.*, Ser. 4, Vol. III, 148.

isiana by a law which was passed in 1861, but was not widely violated until Federal forces invaded and occupied part of the state. This law prohibited the export of cotton except through Confederate ports. Later it included rice, sugar, and other products. The Richmond government ordered officers to confiscate all teams and property in the illicit trade, and to burn all cotton likely to fall into enemy hands. Soon after New Orleans fell, Governor Moore urged the people of his state to obey the law. "There cannot be a war for arms and a peace for trade between two people at the same time," he said. "We cannot barter our produce for theirs. . . . Trading with the enemy is prohibited under all circumstances."[23]

Records show that many patriotic cotton planters burned their own cotton crops. Kate Stone recorded in her diary in May, 1862, that "as far as we can see are the ascending wreaths of smoke and we hear that all the cotton of the Mississippi Valley from Memphis to New Orleans is going up in smoke." She added, however, that the destruction of the money crop had "thrown a gloom over the country."[24] From the Mississippi levee in Baton Rouge in 1862 Sarah Dawson watched Negroes as they rolled bales of cotton to the brink of the river, set them afire, and pushed them in to "float down the river one sheet of living flame."[25] A Natchitoches Parish planter listed, without comment, in his 1864 yearbook the cotton which he burned "by order of the Confederate Government."[26] The *Natchitoches Union* published an account of $5,000,000 worth of cotton burned in that parish during the same year.[27] John Perkins, representative to the Confederate Congress, burned his magnificent home in Northeast Louisi-

[23]*O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XXXIV, 938; Ser. 4, Vol. III, 698; Thomas O. Moore, "Address to the People of Louisiana," June 18, 1862, in Moore Papers.

[24]Anderson (ed.) *Brokenburn*, 100-101.

[25]Sarah Morgan Dawson, *A Confederate Girl's Diary* (New York, 1913), 17-18.

[26]E. N. De Blieux, Yearbook, 1864, in De Blieux Collection (Northwestern State College Library, Natchitoches, Louisiana).

[27]Natchitoches *Union*, April 1, 1864.

ana and 2,000 bales of cotton in order to prevent Federals from taking them.[28]

Many people, including Governor Allen, opposed such destruction of cotton because of the hardships it wrought, especially on the small farmer.[29] General Taylor recalled the appeals of "mothers with suffering children, whose husbands were in the war or already fallen," for permission to take their cotton through the lines.[30] The *Picayune* took a stand against the policy: "We have not and do not intend to advocate the destruction of cotton or other crops by the Southern people. We believe it to be a wanton waste of property."[31]

Not all the cotton went up in smoke. Trading went on with the enemy, especially after Federal forces invaded and occupied part of Louisiana. Not only did citizens trade with Federals, but some Confederate officers promoted the trade. Taylor said: "In vain they were removed; the temptation was too strong, and their successors did the same."[32] William H. Tunnard of the Third Louisiana Regiment wrote tersely in his diary: "Disaffection among our troops about trading with the Yanks."[33] Disloyal Confederates sold cotton to speculators who accompanied General N. P. Banks' Red River expeditions in 1863 and 1864. He wrote later: "Cotton is king, for the army is doing nothing but gathering cotton . . . the rebels were furnishing us with supplies to be shipped back to New Orleans and Brashear City."[34] Robert Patrick of the Fourth Louisiana Infantry visited his home in Clinton in November, 1863, and noted that he found a "great change in the ideas and sentiments of the people. They were trading liberally with the Yankees and hauling cotton to them. . . . This il-

[28]Robert Dabney Calhoun, "The John Perkins Family of Northeast Louisiana," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly,* XVIX (January, 1936), 85.

[29]Dorsey, *Recollections of Henry Watkins Allen,* 281-83.

[30]Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction,* 235.

[31]*Daily Picayune,* April 29, 1862.

[32]Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction,* 235.

[33]William H. Tunnard, Diary, quoted in Bragg, *Louisiana in the Confederacy,* 207.

[34]Frank M. Flinn, *Campaigning with Banks in Louisiana, '63 and '64* (Boston, 1889), 65.

licit trade was carried on to an astonishing extent."[35] This was by no means limited to Louisiana. John M. Daniels, editor of the *Richmond Examiner*, criticized the cotton planters "who were so early and furiously in the field for secession, who . . . are now raising cotton in partnership with their Yankee protectors and shipping it to Yankee markets."[36]

Opposition to conscription, impressment laws, tax-in-kind, and restrictions on trade led to widespread discontent in Confederate Louisiana. As the war went on, evasion of these laws became more prevalent and desertion from the army increased. The exact extent of desertions among Louisiana troops is not known because many official records were lost in the confusion which accompanied defeat and disintegration of the Confederacy. The prevalence of absenteeism is established, however, by official records, newspaper accounts, and contemporary writings. Incomplete returns, published by the United States government in 1866, placed the number at 5,000.[37] That number is lower than the number suggested by other contemporary sources. In November, 1863, General H. W. Allen, later governor, reported to the War Department that 8,000 deserters and skulking conscripts were in the vicinity of Alexandria.[38] Use of available figures reveals that desertion among Louisiana troops was no higher than among the Confederacy as a whole, which John S. Preston, Superintendent of the Bureau of Conscription, placed at 100,000 in March, 1865.[39]

During the first year of the war, high enthusiasm and hopes for an early victory existed among Louisiana troops. Records and accounts do not reveal desertions until after the military defeats during the first months of 1862. Soon after the defeat

[35]F. Jay Taylor, *Reluctant Rebel, the Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 1861-1865* (Baton Rouge, 1959), 21.

[36]Frederick S. Daniel (ed.), *The Richmond Examiner During the War* (New York, 1868), 100.

[37]"Report of the Provost Marshall General," *House Executive Document* No. 1, 39 Cong., 1 Sess., 141.

[38]*O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XXII, Part 2, p. 1029.

[39]*Ibid.*, Ser. 4, Vol. III, 1119-20, 1122.

at Shiloh in April, William Watson from Baton Rouge, then in Bragg's army in Tennessee, recalled numerous desertions. He said: "Though some deserters were caught in the act and shot, that did not stop it, and desertions were taking place every day." The men objected to Bragg's harsh treatment of his troops and to the conscription act, recently passed, which forced them to serve after their year was out. Watson said that the Confederate government and their newspapers tried to "smother it as much as possible," admitting to the loss of several hundred men, but that he had no doubt from what he had seen that several thousand men dropped out or were left behind.[40]

In November, 1862, General Taylor reported to Governor Moore that it was "notorious that a large number of . . . deserters, enrolled conscripts who have failed to report . . . are to be found throughout the State."[41] Winn, Jackson, and the adjoining parishes became infested with deserters and draft dodgers. In Union Parish a number of conscript evaders and deserters banded together to resist troops sent to subdue them, but Confederate officials from Monroe, Shreveport, and Alexandria, who were sent to arrest them, caught and punished many of them.[42] An elderly citizen from Union Parish told the writer that he saw in the 1890's the remains of some of their dugout hiding places in the woods and fields.

Although desertion had become widespread among Louisiana troops in 1862, it increased after the falls of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in 1863. Major W. F. Tunnard from Baton Rouge recalled that two members of the 27th Louisiana Regiment were shot for desertion about that time [July, 1863]. Also in July of that year, Robert Patrick wrote in his diary that the men were low spirited since the fall of Vicksburg and that desertions were frequent, sometimes by the hundreds. Many of these deserters crossed the Mississippi into Louisiana. Officials appealed to them to return to their commands with-

[40]Watson, *Life in the Confederate Army*, 375-79.
[41]*O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XV, 874.
[42]*Ibid.*, Vol. XXVI, Part 2, pp. 194-95.

out delay. District commanders and enrolling officers were ordered to arrest those who did not return.[43]

Feeling that the cause was lost encouraged many desertions. A news item in the *Picayune* told of skirmishes on Pearl River between small groups of Federal and Confederate troops. Confederate prisoners were brought to Federal camp. Seven lieutenants and three or four captains came in and asked to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. Among them were officers from Bragg's army who said they thought the "Confederacy was on its last legs."[44]

Hardships among the troops caused by insufficient food and clothing also led to desertion. The states usually supplied their own troops with clothing, which was hard for Louisiana to do after Federal forces controlled the Mississippi River and part of the state. In February, 1863, Robert Patrick wrote from Port Hudson: "I must say that never since I have been in the army have I fared so badly and in truth I have been almost starved." In December, 1862, he recorded in his diary: "We . . . have had very little clothing and very scanty fare provided for us."[45] Although he did not leave the army, many soldiers under similar hardships did. A report to Richmond from Louisiana in November, 1863, said that "during the cold spell of weather many have absented themselves without furlough and gone home." Also in 1863 an appeal was made to Congressman John Perkins, which told of "painful facts and distressing in the enormity of suffering suggested, because of a want of shoes and clothing. . . . Some of the men didn't have a single blanket."[46]

A soldier from Claiborne Parish recalled: "Not many soldiers in ancient or modern times did more hard service and on such meager supplies than the Confederates."[47] A soldier

[43]W. H. Tunnard, *The History of the Third Regiment Louisiana Infantry* (Baton Rouge, 1866), 321; Taylor, *Reluctant Rebel*, 121-22; *O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XXXIV, Part 2, p. 85.

[44]*Daily Picayune*, August 9, 1863.

[45]Taylor, *Reluctant Rebel*, 71, 91.

[46]*O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. III, 731; Vol. XXI, 1097-98.

[47]James W. Nicholson, *Stories of Dixie* (New York, 1915), 167.

from Thibodaux, who was in the siege of Vicksburg, described some of the hardships experienced there:

> Peas were ground and mixed with corn but proved unpalatable—the ever faithful mule was looked upon with pitiless eye, the scarcity of forage induced us to kill several and distribute the flesh among the officers' messes by way of giving countenance to this novel addition to our menu and preparing the men for it. . . . At intervals during the siege, the ration was reduced, until it was insufficient to sustain life, and the men were forced to gather and cook weeds, and grasses, and buds of trees and roots. . . . I heard some say they ate rats. . . . So we did eat mule, there is no doubt about that.[48]

More than their own suffering, the men worried about their families at home. Letters from home telling of grim want and pinching hunger caused many men to desert. It was hard for them to stay in the army knowing their families needed them. Letters from a Claiborne Parish private revealed such worry, although the soldier did not desert. He wrote: "Ellen you said you hadent no wood nore pine this winter and it looked like nobody cared fore you . . . ," and later: "Ellen I will send you 20 dollards. . . . Don't spend it foolishly fore it is preshes. . . . Times is hard here and i expect they are hard at home."[49]

By November, 1864, men were deserting in great numbers from the Third Louisiana Regiment. Tunnard said the men were disappointed over Lincoln's return to office and the resulting destruction of their hopes that McClellan's peace measures would end the war. "They were disappointed and suffering. Forbearance and patriotism ceased to be virtues . . . and numerous desertions occurred."[50]

During the last year of the war, Confederate military discipline declined. War weariness and a feeling of hopelessness

[48]Winchester Hall, *The Story of the 26th Louisiana Infantry in the Service of the Confederate States* (Privately published, n.d.), 32.

[49]John A. Cawthon (ed.), "Letters of a North Louisiana Private to His Wife, 1862-1865," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXX (March, 1944), 533-40.

[50]Tunnard, *History of the Third Louisiana Infantry*, 330.

for their cause led many more soldiers to go home. General Taylor complained to President Davis of his leniency in dealing with deserters. He said that the increasing numbers from every organization in the army caused him to doubt the wisdom of such a policy. He also complained of General Allen's lenient policy in granting pardons to deserters. "Allen's camps are harbors of refuge into which deserters . . . might escape deserved punishment and even secure rewards," he wrote.[51]

Morale of soldiers went from bad to worse in 1865. After Lee surrendered in April, there was terrible demoralization in the army in Louisiana. "It began to melt away and disband in a most disgraceful manner," said Governor Allen. The officers lost all power to control the men. Soldiers had not been paid in a long time, but in the government depots in Northwest Louisiana they found millions of dollars of Confederate money and boxes of clothing. This infuriated the men who had been ill clothed and unpaid. They robbed the depots and distributed the goods among themselves.[52]

Sometimes weary soldiers, making their way homeward, stole horses from civilians. A Natchitoches Parish planter listed in his 1864 yearbook, two carriage horses, a saddle pony, and a saddle mule, which were stolen by Confederate soldiers. Many deserters took supplies with them, thus depleting supplies sorely needed by those who remained in the army until the last Confederate flag was lowered in Shreveport on June 11, 1865.[53]

Many honest, hard-working men deserted or evaded the draft because they never owned a slave, never participated in the planters' way of life and decided not to defend it. They are not to be confused with bands of lawless men, composed of deserters and draft dodgers, who organized into bodies

[51]*O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XXXIV, 901.

[52]Dorsey, *Recollections of Henry Watkins Allen*, 290-94.

[53]E. N. De Blieux, Yearbook, 1864, De Blieux Collection; J. Fair Hardin, "An Outline of Shreveport and Caddo Parish History," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XVIII (October, 1935), 871.

which they themselves called rangers or guerrillas. They were mounted and armed. When they needed supplies, they sometimes sent one of their number to join the army and desert with these supplies.[54]

These men were commonly referred to as jayhawkers, and this name appeared in official records as early as 1862. They became more numerous as the war went on, operating chiefly in the no-man's land between the Mississippi River, which was controlled by Federals and the Confederate line in central and west Louisiana. The region between the Mississippi and Ouachita rivers and other swamp areas furnished excellent hiding places, although they operated in other parts of the state as well.[55]

Jayhawkers preyed on the helpless citizens of Louisiana, as well as the Federal and Confederate armies. The editor of the *Picayune* commented: "The poor people of the interior—and by this we mean those that are found upon the confines of disputed territory in Louisiana—are in most trying straits. They are between two fires." The editorial said further that many people in that area had fled their homes, leaving their crops unharvested and property unprotected. He appealed to the authorities to protect the people against the guerrillas.[56]

Governor Moore received an appeal from women near Bayou Chicot for protection against the jayhawkers. "We could not fare worse were we surrounded by a band of Lincoln's mercenary hirelings," they wrote. These men pillaged homes, stealing anything they could find. "And if we appeal to the lawless wreches [sic] their reply is that they are but carrying out the orders of their captain [Todd]." It seemed to be the general opinion of that community that these men would incite insurrection or join the Federals at the first opportunity.[57]

[54]Watson, *Life in the Confederate Army*, 388.

[55]Bragg, *Louisiana in the Confederacy*, 198.

[56]*Daily Picayune*, December 4, 1862.

[57]"Letter From a Soldier's Sister to Governor Moore," December 10, 1862, Moore Papers.

Jayhawkers sometimes stole Negro children and sold them in Texas. Sarah Dorsey told of 500 such children being recovered by Governor Allen and restored to their families. "I had occasion to apply to him myself about three children stolen from our plantation in Tensas," she wrote. They even captured Major David F. Boyd, former professor at Louisiana State University. Finding him in dense woods near Alexandria, they took him to the Federals near Vidalia and exchanged him for some coffee and sugar. General Sherman found him there and arranged for the exchange and return to General Taylor's army of his old colleague at the school of which he had been president.[58]

Lieutenant John C. Sibley's diary was filled with accounts of outrages of these marauders. He wrote: "They have declared vengeance against Confederate soldiers. . . . After killing five members of the Home Guard, they almost inhumanly beat their faces to pieces with the breach of their guns so no friend would know them again."[59]

A Confederate officer reported to General Taylor in February, 1864, concerning the activities of jayhawkers in St. Landry Parish. They swept over the country known as Plaquemine Ridge, robbing the inhabitants of anything of value, especially the fine horses and arms. This bold band, which had done this work in daylight, was increasing in numbers and included discontented whites and free Negroes. The officer said it was no longer the case of a few isolated desperadoes; the entire community in the western part of the parish was implicated in these organizations. He asked that steps be taken at once to rid the country of "these murderers, thieves, and traitors."[60]

Similar reports of the activities of jayhawkers came from various parts of the state. An official reported on February 4, 1864, of outrages committed by jayhawkers in Rapides Parish in the area between Little River and Red River. A few months

[58]Dorsey, *Recollections of Henry Watkins Allen*, 244; Nicholson, *Stories from Dixie*, 186-89; *O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XXXIV, Part 2, p. 976.

[59]John C. Sibley, Diary, quoted in Shreveport *Times*, November 3, 1957.

[60]*O. R.*, Ser. 1, Vol. XXIV, Part 2, pp. 965-66.

later, a report came to General Taylor that these bands were "committing serious depredations" on citizens living on Bayou Bartholemew and other points east of the Ouachita River. In the upper part of Washington Parish they banded together in large numbers and claimed to have a government of their own in opposition to the Confederate government.[61]

Both Confederate and Federal military authorities tried to capture or disperse these groups, but judging from military reports they had little success. Difficulties they encountered are shown in the report of a Federal officer stationed at Thibodaux:

> A careful study of the topography of the country on my front leads me to believe there is but one way of getting rid of the guerrillas who infest . . . the country from La Fourche to Grand Lake. If we pursue them with cavalry, they take to their canoes and small boats. If we undertake to cut them off with a gunboat, they run into a chain of smaller bayous where a gunboat cannot follow them. The only plan left . . . is to gather what small boats we can and build enough more to carry, if need be, a force of 125 picked men, and then pursue them and fight them in their own way.[62]

In spite of the difficulties, Confederate and state officials tried to protect the citizens against these raids. A Confederate officer in Monroe was ordered in September, 1863, to proceed to the parishes of Winn, Jackson, and nearby areas to break up bands of jayhawkers there. In February, 1864, other officials were ordered to shoot a band of these men who were hiding in the swamps near Catahoula Lake. Also in February, General Taylor requested a regiment of men in St. Landry Parish because he felt his cavalry force was inadequate to suppress these outrages. State troops were ordered to Rapides Parish to scour that region thoroughly and to shoot on the spot any suspicious person. In February, 1865, an official was ordered to lead a search through the whole country from

[61] *Ibid.*, 944, 967; Vol. XXXII, Part 3, p. 755.

[62] *Ibid.*, Vol. XLVIII, Part 1, p. 775-76.

Trinity to the mouth of Black River and to break up all rendezvous of jayhawkers.[63]

Official records reveal some measure of success in defense against these predatory bands, although they existed until the war ended. A Confederate officer reported from Calcasieu Parish in March, 1864, that he had learned that the commander of the Louisiana District had sent a force into the nest of jayhawkers, and that force had captured and hanged a number of them.[64] A leader of the jayhawkers in that parish was a Dr. Dudley, a physician who evaded the draft. He was called "chief of the jayhawkers" and was captured in January, 1865. Sibley wrote: "A band was routed into the swamps . . . and two were sentenced to be shot. One had a wife and children who came to see him, and oh, it was truly piteous to hear the weeping."[65]

High enthusiasm existed in Louisiana when the war began. After the first year of war, hardships and military defeats lowered the morale of the people, civilians and soldiers alike. Discontent developed in Confederate Louisiana and grew until the war ended. There is no proof of the extent of the damage done by such dissension, but it is safe to conclude that it greatly weakened the war effort. Most of the writers on the Civil War have stressed the bravery and fortitude of the men and women who supported the Lost Cause. Although cooperation seemed to overshadow discord and dissension in Confederate Louisiana, in this Centennial it is well to recall the seamy side as well as the glories in Louisiana's part in the efforts of the Confederacy to establish itself an independent nation.

[63] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVI, Part 2, p. 194; Vol. XXVI, Part 2, pp. 944, 962, 972.
[64] *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXIV, 1025.
[65] Sibley, Diary, quoted in Shreveport *Times*, November 3, 1957.

Philadelphia-Spanish New Orleans Trade in the 1790's

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IN WRITING THE PRESENT paper the author has endeavored to focus attention on a particular segment of early United States trade with Spanish America. Philadelphia has been selected from several other North American ports for this purpose for various reasons: she represented not only the political capital of the nation, but boasted the largest concentration of population and wealth as well.[1] New Orleans, since 1762, had been Spanish politically and French culturally; she was hardly the Philadelphia of the Spanish American world. Mexico City and Lima, for example, were vice-regal capitals where the highest imperial officers projected as much as possible the glory of the Spanish court in America. Nevertheless, New Orleans was of outstanding international interest to the United States during the period immediately following the Revolution. In 1785, it will be recalled, the fruitless Jay-Gardoqui negotiations revealed how deeply anxious were the growing settlements of the American West that the East not attempt to prevent their access to the free navigation of the Mississippi River and New Orleans.

[1]S. E. Forman, *The Rise of American Commerce and Industry* (New York, 1927), 106.

Philadelphia was continuing to experience a dynamic growth during the 1790's. According to the eminent and statistically-minded contemporary Philadelphia physician Dr. James Mease, the city possessed in 1790: "6,651 Dwelling Houses" and "415 Stores and Workshops"; by 1801 the number of dwelling houses had nearly doubled to 11,200. He explained the rapid rate of population increase, interestingly enough, on Philadelphia's unusual economic advantages and superior means of maintaining the public's good health. He believed that the confidence of the inhabitants was responsible for the higher marriage rate in the city, with a corresponding higher birth rate resulting. All this advance was brought about, he stated, because of the "great encouragement given to every class of mechanics, [which] induce[d] more of them to settle here than in other cities."[2]

Philadelphia's "encouragement" to industry was noted by a visiting Frenchman about this same time, Moreau de St. Méry. In keeping with the spirit of the Age of Enlightenment in which he lived, St. Méry compiled the following itemized summary of Philadelphia industries: 10 rope-walks using 100 tons of hemp annually, 13 breweries consuming over 50,000 bushels of barley a year, 6 sugar refineries, 7 powder-making factories, 2 rummeries and 1 distillery, 3 playing card factories, 3 factories for cut nails, 1 for uncut nails, 1 for oil color, 11 for brushes, 2 for buttons, 1 for Morocco leather, 1 for parchment, as well as cannon foundries, coppersmiths, hatmakers, tinsmiths, and so forth. In reference to their reputation and state of morality St. Méry found Philadelphians and Americans somewhat lacking, too preoccupied with their economic pursuits and tainted with "trickiness" and commercialism.[3] This unflattering view was to be repeated by more than one Spanish Louisiana businessman and aristocrat as Americans began to trade with New Orleans toward the end of the eighteenth century.

[2]James Mease, *The Picture of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1811), 31, 38-40.

[3]Kenneth and Anna M. Roberts (eds. and trans.), *Moreau de St. Méry's American Journey* [1793-1798] (New York, 1947), 361.

One of the many interesting and original names given to American merchant vessels of this period was *Adventure*, a word which quite adequately described the basic nature of the Philadelphia-Spanish New Orleans trade during the 1790's.[4] Philadelphia merchants who sought to engage in this trade were often able men of rare ability in an age when individualism characterized American commercial activities. An outstanding example was Oliver Pollock, recognized patriot of the Revolution because of his successful enlistment of Spanish Louisiana support in his country's hour of need, who not only maintained his war-time Spanish commercial contacts after 1783, but also sought to boost those of a son, Procopio Jacinto, in the same direction.[5]

The elder Pollock's trading ventures in Spanish Louisiana were especially promising as a result of his former dealings with high-placed officials and merchants of that province. In February, 1789, he approached the then Governor Esteban Miró[6] with an ambitious proposition to introduce into Louisiana each year for five years 7,000 barrels of flour and 200 "tuns" or casks of tobacco. One half of the profits made from each cargo so shipped was to be appropriated by the royal treasury in joint payment on the 74,087 *pesos*[7] owed to the Spanish government because of previous loans to the revolutionary Continential Congress, as well as the 59,442 *pesos*, 4 *reales*, which the United States owed to private individuals in the province. The governor agreed to the proposition, pro-

[4]United States Customs Records, Port of Philadelphia, Inward Entries, March 8, 1803 (National Archives).

[5]Thomas Mifflin to Luis de las Casas, Philadelphia, July 13, 1796, Archivo de Indias, Seville, Papeles procedentes de Cuba, photographs of original MSS, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, *legajo* 1469. (Hereinafter cited as AGI, PC, *leg.* .....) Pollock's contacts included Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania, who wrote a letter recommending Pollock's son to the Captain General of Cuba.

[6]This name is often spelled Estevan Miró.

[7]A *peso* was worth about a dollar in American money; the *real*, about ten cents. See *Philadelphia Directory*, 1793, Appendix.

vided that the American pay the legal custom duties on the inward and outward cargoes involved in the trade.[8]

The Spanish-speaking Pollock was cited by the New Orleans *Cabildo*[9] in its official minutes during the summer of 1789 for his commercial activities, which also took on a mantle of public service and which beautifully illustrates Pollock's talent for combining business with politics. The *cabildo* officially commended him for his part in delivering to the city one "fire pump" from Philadelphia at a cost of only 326 *pesos*, 2 *reales*, including transportation charges. The *cabildo* took note of the fact that Pollock's handling of this transaction was accomplished with no profit being made by him, a service for which it desired to express its gratitude to this gentleman Yankee merchant.[10]

Stephen Girard, who was a figure of considerable importance in the economic life of the young republic, had gained first hand experience in the Spanish Mississippi trade. During the American Revolution he had sailed as mate aboard the *Aimable Louise* for two years on the New York-New Orleans run, acting for Thomas Randall, who was a prominent shipowner and commission merchant. Girard maintained a small venture of his own on each voyage, probably smuggling such goods as arms and powder past the customs guards at New Orleans, but kept no records of these particular trading activities.[11] It was after the Revolution, however, that Girard's financial worth and genius for increasing investments at Philadelphia enjoyed the most remarkable improvement and steady growth. A letter of recommendation in his hand soon became a rich possession to the lucky owner.

[8]Caroline M. Burson, *The Stewardship of Don Esteban Miró, 1782-1792* (New Orleans, 1940), 80-81.

[9]This was the local governing body of the city, which also enjoyed considerable say in economic matters both in and around the town.

[10]Actas de Cabildo, Minutes of July 3 and August, 1789 (New Orleans Public Library). See also Burson, *Don Esteban Miró*, 276, n. 88.

[11]Harry E. Wildes, *Lonely Midas: The Story of Stephen Girard* (New York, 1943), 22-23.

In July, 1792, New Orleans businessman Michel Fortier could boast two such letters addressed to Girard's business contacts in the Spanish province of Louisiana. In the one, to a Cavalier Jeune, Girard described Fortier as an individual who was attempting to repair severe losses occasioned by the French Revolution;[12] the second letter was addressed to Gérome la Chapelle.[13] The following October Fortier informed Girard that he had presented himself and the letter of recommendation to "*Monsieur* Jeune," offering an interesting first-hand impression on Philadelphia-Spanish New Orleans commercial potentialities: "The country, as you told me, does not offer any great opportunities for a young man with small means although possessed of a good knowledge of business."[14]

Fortier pointed out that the province consumed more than it produced; nevertheless, he was optimistic regarding possible trade between Spanish New Orleans and Philadelphia. "A good business" could be promoted respecting such products as superfine flour, gin, Marseilles soap, Provence oil, Málaga raisins, prunes, almonds, and hams. He reminded the Philadelphia merchant that all of these goods were being transported on Girard's ships making their return trips from Marseilles. He further assured Girard that he could easily obtain permission to go to the "Cap" (Cape Français, French West Indies) where a vessel and cargo could be purchased, although a 20 per cent duty would be levied on their estimated value.

Fortier admitted that specie would be difficult to acquire in return for New Orleans imports; but one could easily exchange merchandise for indigo and furs and then sell them to advantage in Bordeaux. Hence, it was his considered opinion that if Girard should decide to trade with Spanish New Orleans, there was every indication that such a move would result in achieving handsome profits. Enclosed in Fortier's letter was a list of prices current for articles mentioned by him

[12]Girard to Jeune, July 1, 1792, Philadelphia, Letter Book 3, Girard Papers (Girard College, Philadelphia).

[13]Girard to la Chapelle, July 30, 1792, *ibid.*

[14]Fortier to Girard, October 4, 1792, New Orleans, Letters Received, *ibid.*

pertaining to the market at New Orleans. Girard was invited to make use of the information as he saw fit.

How could such a trade be successfully carried on in view of Spain's policy of maintaining exclusive commercial control over the economic life of her colonies? Fortier readily supplied the answer to this problem. He pointed out that the merchants of New Orleans enjoyed the privilege to conduct voyages of trade with the French West Indian possessions, as well as permission to travel to Philadelphia. The last named port, as a matter of fact, was commonly referred to as the "New Cape", inasmuch as it was the usual practice for New Orleans outward-bound vessels to Cape Français subsequently to call at the middle Atlantic port of the United States, "the voyage therefore can be made with perfect security, providing the ship touches at the Cape [Français] and is redispatched from there." Fortier injected the personal observation that he intended to remain only temporarily in the province of Louisiana—for about two years; but should his business ventures prove prosperous, he would very possibly establish permanent residence there. At present he was engaged in managing the affairs of a certain Jean Reynaud.[15]

By the following summer Fortier had a most promising report for Girard regarding his commercial accomplishments in the province thus far. Gallantly, and no doubt sincerely, Fortier attributed his promising business career in New Orleans to the application of Girard's solid advice "to be bold in business." He related how he had "sold for 100% more than the price of other years to Mr. Clark of your city [probably Daniel, Jr.,] and to Mr. Chos [probably Daniel W. Coxe, Clark's partner]" furs that he had acquired in the local Indian trade. Obviously making a bid for closer economic ties with the merchant prince of Philadelphia, Fortier requested that Girard advise him further on the prices current in his city for "bear skins, raccoon, otter, beaver and deer skins with the hair on." It was Fortier's understanding that such hides would command a very good price at that time in Philadelphia.

[15]*Ibid.*

Fortier went so far as to extend a definite offer to Girard to become a third partner in a firm including himself and a Mr. Riviere, "a merchant of this city and my friend and partner." According to him Riviere was an invaluable asset to the ready promotion of a highly successful trade between Philadelphia and New Orleans. This individual had the know-how for obtaining all of the necessary permits for the proposed trade since Governor Carondelet of Louisiana was a "close friend." Moreover, it was well within the means of this highly placed official to bestow a preferred status upon Riviere in the awarding of flour and pork contracts let out by the Spanish government. In view of the recent outbreak of hostilities between Spain and France (May, 1793), the last named article was destined to become a "lucrative" item of trade. The Spanish government was likewise a potential good customer for such other goods as carbines, trade muskets, copper caldrons, and so forth, that were needed as presents which "the Governor [was] constantly giving the savages." Fortier hoped that Girard would forward to New Orleans the prices current on Philadelphia flour, and at the same time he guaranteed the eastern merchant the purchase of all sent from that port to New Orleans. Inasmuch as the price in the Mississippi port was confidently expected to rise, the suggested flour transaction would redound to the advantage of both.

Fortier concluded his serious letter by mentioning that his friend Mr. P. Fouet, the bearer of the present message, held some skins for the account of Mr. Trieva, a merchant of New Orleans, to be sold in Philadelphia or shipped on to France. Would Girard be so kind as to render whatever aid he could to the gentleman from New Orleans? And, finally, Fortier made last minute inducements to attract Girard's favorable business reply to this letter. Would Girard like to prepare a cargo for shipment to New Orleans? Fortier was prepared to accept flour, pork, and oil.[16]

A primary aim of Philadelphia merchants attempting to

[16] *Id.* to *id.*, July 23, 1793, New Orleans, *ibid.*

trade with Spanish New Orleans after 1789 was to exchange their bulky products, such as flour, for specie. Acceptable hard currency constituted one of the most serious shortages of the new, independent American nation, as it had during the entire colonial period. It was not uncommon for Philadelphia property owners to declare publicly their preference for Spanish specie in their business affairs of the age. Thus, in March of 1788, real estate that was situated on the north side of Prune or Locust Street, Philadelphia, was advertised in the Pennsylvania *Packet* of March 29 as "subject to the payment of the yearly rent or sum of 36 Spanish milled dollars." On January 8, 1789, a notice appeared in the same newspaper declaring that the Trustees of the University [of Pennsylvania] would receive ground rents partly in bushels of wheat. Specie was indeed scarce in Philadelphia!

Daniel W. Coxe, an active and influential merchant of the port, dispatched numerous ships out of Philadelphia to Spanish New Orleans, with the fervent hope that the return cargo would consist of some specie. Certainly, he, if anyone, had ample justification for optimism as he enjoyed the acquaintance of key contacts in both centers of trade. His brother Tench Coxe was appointed as the assistant treasurer to Alexander Hamilton, May 10, 1790. One direct benefit of Tench's appointment to Daniel was the transfer of the former's commercial holdings to Daniel in order to avoid a conflict-of-interest charge. Such a charge had led straight to the downfall of the previous assistant treasurer, William Duer, who had been in office but seven months when the end came.[17]

Together with his partner Daniel Clark, Jr., who merged with Coxe during the year 1793, when war broke out between Spain and France, he sought to represent other Philadelphia merchants interested in developing the Mississippi

[17]Harold Hutcheson, *Tench Coxe: A Study in American Economic Development* (Baltimore, 1938), 20-21.

trade.[18] Clark was an excellent choice and it is doubtful whether Coxe could have secured a better one in the entire Spanish province of Louisiana.

Born in Sligo, Ireland, and educated at the socially prominent Eton of England, Clark later emigrated to America, where he spent a short period at Germantown[19] with his family. In 1786 he traveled to New Orleans at the invitation of his uncle, Daniel Clark, who was a respected planter and merchant in the province. His engaging personality, ambitious aims, and sober-minded attention to business and social obligations soon served to establish the young outsider. His creditable qualities and talents, including that of proficiency in the Spanish language, even won for him the all-important acceptance of the local officials, including the governor. He sought and conquered the finest elements of creole aristocracy as well.[20] This resulted in social as well as economic advantages to the young Clark.

Indicative of the nature of the services rendered by Clark and Coxe to their clients, such as Reed and Forde of Philadelphia, was the letter they received in May, 1793. In it Reed and Forde notified them of their shipment aboard the schooner *Betsy*, with a cargo of assorted goods, including brandy, sherry, pepper, and muslin. Clark, at New Orleans, was directed to assemble a return cargo of "furs, segars, Indigo."[21] These items and tobacco, it should be noted, represented New Orleans's chief exports to Philadelphia until about 1795. Since a considerable quantity of finished goods, including re-exports from Great Britain, were shipped into Louisiana from Philadelphia,

[18]Arthur P. Whitaker, "Reed and Forde: Merchant Adventurers of Philadelphia, Their Trade with Spanish New Orleans," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LX (1957), 252. Professor Whitaker's primary sources for this article consist of letter books which are located in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, where numerous other such sources are to be found.

[19]This is now a part of the city of Philadelphia.

[20]Nolan B. Harmon, Jr., *The Famous Case of Myra Clark Gaines* (Baton Rouge, 1946), 3-10.

[21]Reed and Forde to Coxe and Clark, May 26, 1793, Philadelphia, Reed and Forde Letter Book, 1793-1794, Reed and Forde Collection (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia).

the resulting unfavorable balance of trade necessitated the illegal exportation of specie to settle all of the colonists' accounts. The only thing wrong with this sort of trade, from the point of view of the Philadelphia merchant, was that there was not enough of it!

By far the most valuable service that Daniel Clark, Jr., extended to those Americans seeking his aid in the pursuit of Louisiana trade was that of cutting through the discouraging mass of Spanish commercial restrictions. Here his superb connections with the local officials were virtually indispensable in overcoming endless delays or even possible disaster. Placing the all-important bribe in the right hands was, for example, a necessary technique that was religiously and adroitly employed by Clark to the Philadelphians' trading advantage. Although a complete discussion of the Spanish trade laws is not warranted by the scope of this study, suffice it to say that Spain was wholly committed to the theory of absolute monopolistic control of her colonial commerce. But emergencies, such as those induced by war conditions, obliged the Spanish court to suspend or even to ignore its own strict measures from time to time. By having an "in", so to speak, Clark was able to exploit these emergencies and to obtain legal permits for American ships to trade with New Orleans.[22] Clark's clients also valued his shrewd advice on how to export the much-desired specie out of the province that had been exchanged for American merchandise imported into it.[23]

Performing a real service to the Philadelphia-New Orleans merchant of this period was the local newspaper. Containing but four pages, it offered a wealth of useful commercial facts to the shipping and mercantile classes. Spanish consulates in

[22]Deposition of William Porter, April 28, 1808, Gilpin Papers (Historical Society of Pennsylvania). Porter was Clark's secretary-clerk from 1793 to 1799.

[23]Gilpin Papers. This is an unsigned and undated memorandum, probably of the 1790's, that describes how cash was smuggled out of Havana to American merchants, the "universal practice at the time & in certain cases is so still in all Spanish Ports." Reed and Forde were concerned about Clark's ability to get specie out of Louisiana for them.

Philadelphia often noticed items worthy of the attention of their superiors and took the trouble to send complete copies. Their arrangement was such that the "news" did not ordinarily occupy the front page, as in the modern press, but commenced on the second page. Commercial advertisements and official notices were evidently more valued and blanketed the first and last pages. Thus the subscriber had access to such vital and indispensable data as the prices current in Spanish New Orleans, carefully spelled out in the November 10, 1801, Philadelphia *Gazette of the United States (Country Edition)*. Quite frequently there appeared brief items that sought to provide analyses of current economic conditions, locally and internationally. In today's press they would probably be found on the financial page. An example of such an item that appeared in 1789 follows:

> A general and uninterrupted trade has taken place between the inhabitants of this country [Kentucky] and those of the Spanish settlements at New Orleans. Several boats loaded with goods to a very considerable amount have arrived here, and in return they took large quantities of tobacco, beef, corn. . . .[24]

Especially significant about the nature of Philadelphia-New Orleans trade during the period of the present study was, of course, its international complexities. When it is recalled that Spain's fundamental commercial policy was monopolistic, it would seem that American merchants seeking the Mississippi trade were seriously handicapped at the very start. Yet the despatches of various Spanish government officials, such as consuls in Philadelphia, offer frequent examples that goods and specie were exchanged between the two cities, even before the treaty of San Lorenzo of 1795.

On June 17, 1793, Josef de Jáudenes and Josef Ignacio de Viar, Spain's Encargados de negocios in Philadelphia, who also acted as consuls, wrote to Don Luís de las Casas, the Captain General at Havana, on the subject of flour shipments sent to

[24]Pittsburgh Gazette, April 18, 1789. This item is datelined Kentucky, March 2, 1789, and is a letter extract.

Spain and Louisiana through their efforts. As a result, they declared, they were decidedly short of cash reserves; could more specie be remitted from Havana?[25] A month and a half later they were forced by circumstances to repeat the same bothersome plea for funds to Cuba.[26]

One method of furnishing Spanish American ports with scarce United States flour, vessels, and various other vital supplies was to issue passports to Philadelphia merchants, permitting them to trade for this stated purpose. In a despatch dated September 22, 1794, Jáudenes explained the policy which he followed in fulfilling this function:

> Since the beginning my plan has been to give permits to those American Merchants, who on every occasion have performed Services to our Nation with honor, unselfishly, and upon whom I can count for not taking advantage of these permits to introduce contraband there [Havana—to which he could have added New Orleans, as permits to that port were also granted].
>
> Other Subjects [that is, besides American merchants] to whom permits have been granted have received them on the same basis of confidence on their honor, and because they have a connection of influence with this Government [of the United States] with those whom I can facilitate the best Service for the King.[27]

The essential consideration, stated Jáudenes, was to enable Philadelphia merchants to gain a "moderate" price for their goods in the Spanish American port. This could only be accomplished by preventing a "surplus of supplies" *(una superabundancia de provisiones)* from accumulating through the issuance of too many permits, thereby causing losses to the merchants. These losses would result "inevitably in a mass of complaints directed against Spain, and against me."[28]

Commenting on a charge that he (Jáudenes) had been

[25]AGI, PC, *leg.* 1469, Philadelphia.
[26]*Ibid.*, Philadelphia, August 1, 1793.
[27]Jáudenes to las Casas, *ibid.*
[28]*Ibid.*

granting a monopoly of the permits to certain American merchants, he attempted to defend his innocence. In determining any request for a permit he was guided, he claimed, solely by the question of the firm's solvency and activity in the trade, as well as its having rendered him services in the past.[29] It is rather interesting to note that this Spanish agent, while residing in Philadelphia, learned to respect the influence of American public opinion. This subject appeared, in one instance, in connection with his concern over his reputation, which, he said, was being slandered by certain Spanish merchants whom he had denied the privilege of trading permits. These vented their spite against Jáudenes by accusing him of being guided in his choices by bribery; such talk was capable of defaming his good name. He personally asked that the captain general take the necessary steps to put an end to such dangerous rumors:

> . . . it is begged to inform one on how fundamentally important public opinion is in this country (very much unlike all the others), and consequently Your Excellency would approve that I escape by all logical means from exposing myself to public censure from the people who are unable to make distinctions, which Your Excellency and other subjects of worth have made . . . in this affair.[30]

As for the aim of establishing a recognized American consul in Spanish New Orleans, the interested Philadelphia merchant, as well as the federal government, labored in vain. The one individual who performed the services of a consul more successfully than any other appointed by the American government was Daniel Clark, Jr. Spain's policy of exclusive control of her colonial commerce, although not backed by local enforcement, did prevent ultimate confirmation of any American consular appointee to New Orleans. Yet with the constantly increasing numbers of Americans engaging in the Mississippi trade, this seemingly hard-headed stubbornness on the part of the court was a perpetual annoyance.

[29]*Ibid.*

[30]Jáudenes to las Casas, January 17, 1795, Philadelphia, *ibid.*

That the services of a consul were needed most desperately by American merchants was indicated by the growing number of complaints received by the Secretary of State of the United States on that problem. These complaints comprised such difficulties as bad legal representation—partly due to the language barrier—, inadequate medical attention to stricken seamen, and alleged abuses of American "rights" in general to trade in Louisiana.

Those Philadelphia merchants who did hazard an adventure with Spanish New Orleans by making use of temporary permits obtained from consuls such as Jáudenes and Viar were not destined to succeed merely on the basis of acquiring this privilege. It was necessary to overcome other legal technicalities, one of the most important the exportation of specie from that Province. Specie, the one article desired by all Americans, was a magnet which drew the Philadelphian to the Mississippi port like the proverbial bear to honey. The question of the existence of this item in New Orleans was the one subject that repeatedly appeared in the business correspondence of Philadelphia-Spanish New Orleans merchants. Mentioning this topic to Coxe and Clark, their New Orleans agents, Reed and Forde of Philadelphia hoped that they could persuade the government officials there to ease the restrictions regarding it.[31]

It did not sit at all well with these eastern merchants that they should be obliged to pay a duty on all such specie exported from the Province to them. Moreover, such payments, when added to the irksome duty of six per cent on the exportation of produce from the colony, seemed an excessively unfair burden. Reed and Forde objected to this law, and they advised their agents that they would refuse "to take any on freight at the rate of 6% unless it [was] for particular friends."[32]

[31]Reed and Forde to Coxe and Clark, May 26, 1793, Philadelphia, Reed and Forde Letter Book.

[32]*Ibid.*

The goods of trade have seldom moved in straight lines. Considerable specie found its way from Spanish New Orleans to Philadelphia by way of the French West Indies, which were open to the merchants of both ports. The United States Customs Records for the port of Philadelphia and the business correspondence of the period reveal the economic interdependence involving the American East and West, Spanish Louisiana and the French West Indies. The Cliffords of Philadelphia were carrying on such a complex trade with Lexington, Nashville, Natchez, and Spanish New Orleans. Their correspondence with agents in these respective centers—Evan Jones, the American consular appointee, was their agent at New Orleans —throws considerable light on the economic and political problems facing the United States in that critical period of its history. Jones' letter to the Cliffords, dated September 25, 1802, may be offered as typical of this economic development. In it he referred to such varied topics as the conditions at New Orleans, the low price of sugar abroad and the heavy duty charged for its [sugar's] export from Louisiana, causing its sales to become "dull." He did expect that American vessels would be in great demand the following spring, as crops were very promising, and would also be needed to transport sugar cases to Havana—a promising field which Americans had been neglecting. Finally, he notified the Philadelphians that their goods had been shipped to Natchez, where there was precious little specie on hand.[33]

Thomas and John Clifford's firm did well to keep abreast, as they were doing, of western economic conditions. The western Pennsylvanians inhabiting the Pittsburgh area, as well as the new Ohio and Kentucky settlers who were ever interested in finding a market for their bulky goods, frequently became the cash customers of Philadelphia merchants. These Westerners would aim their flatboats with cargoes of flour and pork toward Spanish New Orleans between February and May, when the Ohio and Mississippi "ran with full chan-

[33]Jones to the Cliffords, September 25, 1802, New Orleans, Clifford Papers (Historical Society of Pennsylvania).

nel." Once reaching his goal, he sold both produce and boat and then embarked for Havana, returning to the eastern seaboard of the United States by sea. He momentarily stopped at Philadelphia, seeing to some purchases of fine fabrics and other finished goods with the Spanish specie he had obtained for his produce. He then returned home over the mountains and rejoined the family from which he had been separated by a journey of some four to six months' duration.[34]

The outlook for an active and prosperous trade between Philadelphia and Spanish New Orleans in the early 1790's appeared sufficiently promising to entice some of the most substantial merchants of the American port of Philadelphia. Granted the risks were great, the reward was equally great; for the Spanish colony possessed that most wanted of all articles—specie. Spanish New Orleans absolutely needed Philadelphia's flour, and was willing to look over its supply of finished goods as well. Economically, therefore, the two cities were quite compatible, and the forces attempting to disrupt such compatibility appeared to be resistible. These forces might be described as pertaining to the world of nature and the world of man. Illustrative of the former were the difficult transportation and communication obstacles imposed by adverse geographic conditions; example of the latter, the lurking coastal privateer of the Mississippi River pirate just around an unsuspecting bend. Either route imposed a definite limitation upon the merchant striving to maintain an easy, regular and efficient flow of goods between the two ports.

Philadelphia merchants, however, comprised a most admirably equipped class of merchant adventurers. Certainly, they were not surpassed in the nation. They had access to the services of banking houses, insurance companies, an outstanding shipbuilding industry and a commercially-minded press, which was an amazing disseminator of current economic information from the world over. The economic prominence

[34]Justin Winsor, *The Westward Movement: The Colonies and the Republic West of the Alleghenies, 1763-1798, with Full Cartographical Illustrations from Contemporary Sources* (Boston, 1897), 413-14.

of Philadelphia at this point in American history was matched only by its political importance, symbolized by the fact of its being the nation's capital.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Philadelphia-New Orleans trade was closely linked with that of the American West and the Spanish and French West Indies. Pittsburgh, Havana, Cape Français, and Port-au-Prince constituted key points of this chain.

The monopolistic trade laws of Spain exerted a powerful force—not toward diminishing this trade, but rather toward stimulating the activities of smugglers. Before the treaty of San Lorenzo (1795), which opened the Mississippi to all Americans and extended the indispensable privilege of deposit at New Orleans, the art of smuggling was widely practiced in the Spanish possession. It continued to flourish afterwards, to the greater benefit of Americans.

Vignettes

Baseball and the Civil War

Although a game called "town ball, soak ball, or sting ball, was played in small towns throughout the colonies," by children, a real adult's game first emerged in the middle eighteen forties. Most devotees of the game considered the coming of the Civil War its death knell.

> Yet the war was actually the means of making baseball a truly national game. It was played under various rules in every camp; . . . And when the troops went home there were a hundred times as many baseball players in the country as there had been in 1860.

Robert Smith, *Baseball, A Historical Narrative of the Game, The Men Who Played It, and Its Place in American Life* (New York, 1947), 27, 32, 46-47.

Southeastern Louisiana College — Martina Buck

Intrex

"New Orleans' developments in port facilities, cheap waterways transportation and economic power launched a movement to establish an International Trade Exhibition in that city—'the only permanent and continuous fair in the Americas,' the New World counterpart of the Leipzig fair, some five hundred years old. Businessmen subscribed $160,000 of stock. President Coolidge issued a proclamation endorsing the project, and the War Department turned over to the management, rent-free, one of its warehouses on the Mississippi river and the Industrial canal. C. L. Wallace, who had been receiver of the Texas and Pacific Railroad, was chosen to effectuate the plans. On July 16, 1924, he announced that the Exhibition would open January 1 of the next year.

"January came, but it brought no Exhibition. Neither did February, nor March. The months slipped by. The project shortened its name to Intrex, but had nothing further to show for all the preparation. Foreign governments did not know this. Acting on President Coolidge's invitation, they began to send their displays, and there was no place to put them. Inquiries began to reach Washington

through diplomatic channels; President Coolidge called in the two Louisiana Senators and asked what was the matter with New Orleans. They passed the word to Mayor Martin Behrman, and he called in some of the city's business leaders. 'What are we going to do about it?' asked the mayor. 'Nearly a year has passed since we promised to open the Exhibition. Exhibits from Mexico, Guatemala and Cuba are here, cluttering up warehouses, and our president is in a most embarrassing position.'

"One of the men at the conference suggested that if a committee could sell 20,000 square feet of exhibit space to New Orleans manufacturers at $3 a foot, the Exhibition could be opened. 'I appoint you chairman,' said the mayor. 'Pick your own committee. Report back in three days.'

"S. Odenheimer was a busy man—president of the Lane Cotton Mills, chairman of the Manufacturers' Bureau of the Association of Commerce, and civic worker ever since his arrival in New Orleans forty years before. Because he was such a busy man, he had time for this job, and he reported back to the mayor in two days.

" 'All the space is sold.' "

" 'Good. Now you run the Exhibition.' "

" 'But, Mr. Mayor, I have my own business—' "

" 'And you run it most successfully. That's the reason why I nominate you to be president of the Exhibition. Mr. Wallace is resigning. New Orleans needs you.' "

"Mr. Odenheimer accepted that responsibility on December 12, 1925. He abolished 'Intrex' and announced that the Permanent International Trade Exhibition would open on February 1, 1926. There was a mighty lifting of eyebrows. It just could not be done!

"Odenheimer found an empty treasury, except for one postage stamp. On his own credit he borrowed $150,000 from the Whitney National Bank. He put laborers, painters, and carpenters to work by the hundred. They cleaned and renovated the six-story structure, containing half a million square feet of floor space, they built the exhibit booths, they even created a lawn with a fountain.

"From the beginning, the *Times-Picayune* had supported the project. When Mr. Odenheimer took charge, its enthusiasm rose.

It did not question his ability to open on the day he specified. On December 29 it issued four special sections, containing fifty-six pages, emphasizing the importance of a development which in a few years could be expected to double the port's business.

"On February 1 the Exhibition opened. President Coolidge, in Washington, touched the nugget-studded telegraph key with which President Taft had opened the Alaska-Yukon Pacific Exhibition in 1909, and a gong sounded in New Orleans. There was a military parade; there was a twenty-one gun salute; there were speeches by Mr. Odenheimer, Mayor William A. Dever of Chicago, Acting Mayor Arthur J. O'Keefe of New Orleans, Congressman J. Zach Spearing, and several consuls. Then the thousands gathered in front of the building entered and looked at the displays of two hundred exhibitors covering 167,000 square feet of floor space—displays which dramatized the principal economic resources of many states and many foreign countries.

"It became a mart, that Exhibition; it became one of the sights of the city, visited by citizens and tourists alike; it became the meeting place for civic organizations.

"Came the depression which began with the Stock Market crash of 1929. Business began to contract. It became increasingly difficult to sell space—or anything else; many exhibits were withdrawn.

"Income fell below expenses. Odenheimer paid the difference out of his own pocket. In him lurked no thought of quitting, as long as there was hope. He asked the government for a subsidy to tide the Exhibition through the crisis. 'Let us not lose the gains we have made in developing an international market,' he urged.

"Government officials agreed that the Exhibition must be continued. The ways were prepared for a $500,000 appropriation, contingent upon Louisiana's matching that with $100,000.

"The Louisiana Legislature passed such a measure, and Governor Huey P. Long signed it. When Mr. Odenheimer tried to collect, he discovered the joker. The bill provided for the allocation of monies not otherwise employed, and Governor Long could not find $100,000 that was unemployed. He was offended at Odenheimer because of the latter's opposition to certain labor bills supported by the governor which, if enacted, would have put Louisiana at a competitive disadvantage with other states. He blamed Odenheimer for their

defeat. Then and subsequently he rewarded those who supported him, and punished those who opposed him.

"Then and then only did Mr. Odenheimer give up hope. Already he had put $160,000 of his own money into the Exhibition. He could not continue to pay its way. On February 27, 1931 the stockholders voted to dissolve the Exhibition. The state never met its obligation, and of course the Federal government declined to give support when the home folks abandoned the enterprise.

"Every bill was paid. No one lost any money except the stockholders of the Wallace period and Mr. Odenheimer.

" 'The Exhibition,' said Mr. Odenheimer in the *Times-Picayune* of February 28, 1931, 'was the greatest asset New Orleans ever had. Its advantages were so great that the citizens of the city eventually will start the same move over.' "

Thomas Ewing Dabney, *One Hundred Great Years* (Baton Rouge, 1944), 423-26.

Louisiana State University — EDITOR

SOPHIE WRIGHT

"Another great work in New Orleans had its beginnings in the humble endeavour of a woman to help a fellow-creature. A circus had come to town, and, although the animals were well trained and there were clever riders and acrobats, the show had been a dead failure. The last day came, the circus was disbanded, and the pleasant smell of sawdust lingered in the air. The manager had said good-bye, and these strolling players were free to find what occupations they could. Fate sat smiling and turning over in her roguish, inventive mind what should result from this sad little failure. Then she clapped her hands and laughed, as she saw the largest night school in New Orleans arising from that soiled heap of tarnished, spangled, torn tarletan and cast-off finery.

"One of the performers, a young athlete of twenty-five, a fine specimen of manhood, had awakened to the fact that he wanted to do more than exhibit his muscles to the multitude. If he only had a little more education, he thought, he would try for a place in the Civil Service, settle down to steady occupation, and have a home of his own with regularity and certainty in his life.

"As he wandered about he saw a sign, 'Day School for Girls.' Why not here as well as anywhere? He walked up the path. He rang the bell, and a girl came to the door. She was delicate and crippled, but the self-sacrificing soul of the universal mother shone from her tender eyes. He humbly answered the look, and knew he had found succour. In short, broken sentences he told his simple little story—how he had run away from home as a boy, joined a circus, and had no education. 'Could she, would she help him?' And she said impulsively, 'Certainly I can and will help you.'

"Then she considered that all her days were occupied, her time being closely divided between teaching in her own seminary and the Normal School. The man said, 'I have no money, not a penny; you will even have to give me a spelling-book.' And the girl answered, 'I'll manage that, but I'm poor too. I work all day teaching and have only my nights free. Can you come then?'

"Of course he could, and he was only the first of a steady stream that began to flow, ever broadening, through the wide-opened heavenly door. Her willing maternal hands began to lift the thick heavy veil of ignorance from the poor and needy and to let in, little by little, the light upon their dark benighted way.

"With her hard work all day, her crippled frame and over-active brain, sometimes the weak body was tired, but she worked on, undaunted in spirit, widening her scope of influence, until there was scarcely a corner in New Orleans where it was not felt, and where the name of Sophie Wright was not honoured and known. Volunteers came to help in the noble work, and only two conditions were exacted of the pupils—they must be unable to attend day schools on account of being employed during the hours when they were open, and they must be too poor to pay for lessons.

"In the meantime her own school, the Home Institute, had prospered. Her pupils were well-to-do girls; she did her duty strictly by them, but her struggling, ignorant men and needy boys were her real children. They were creatures to whom she was necessary. She was their helpful, spiritual mother and teacher. She was giving them the means through education to earn their bread and to better themselves. Jews, Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants, the school was open to all. Grown men came to learn their A, B, C's, boys to improve their arithmetic, young men to learn mechanical drawing. And frail, crippled, with no rich patrons, Sophie Wright

dared Fate. She fearlessly borrowed the money for her night school at eight per cent compound interest. She bought a larger house. Her guardian angel hovered ever near her. The day school prospered. She put all the money into books, maps, and articles necessary for the night school, and even with her constant outlay she reduced her debt one-half, until the yellow fever swept New Orleans. Then she turned her schoolhouse into a dispensary to which food, clothes, old linen and medicines were sent for distribution, and there she stayed except when on her tours through the afflicted city.

"When the frost came to kill the detestable stegomyia, the poisonous striped mosquito, and the fever was finally routed, Sophie Wright was face to face with ruin. Apparently neither her own school could go on, nor the night school, which was so dear to her heart. But Heaven again befriended her. A banker took over her mortgage and lent her ten thousand dollars, while two men interested in her school each promised two thousand dollars a year. Before the yellow fever came she had had three hundred pupils in her night school; before the end of the following year she had a thousand. And she not only had room for them, but clean books, stout desks, good maps, and forty teachers to assist her. There were European teachers who understood foreign languages to instruct the raw immigrants and now girls were also admitted to certain departments. The course was enlarged to algebra, geometry, calculus, shorthand, mechanical drawing, bookkeeping and history. All sorts and conditions of students came—clerks, machinists, typesetters, errand boys, post office boys, newsboys, bootblacks, and finally, the 'Spasm Band,' a group of nameless waifs who sold papers by day and made night hideous with horrible noises. Stale Bread, the leader, had decided that Slowfoot, Pete, Warmgravy, Zu-Zu, and Rum-Punch must be educated. They however, proved too wild even for Miss Sophie's strong will to subdue, and only Stale Bread remained until he could read, then, sadly enough, blindness blotted out the newly acquired letters from his sight. But the night school prospered, although the debt of ten thousand dollars still remained, until a cheque for the amount, accompanied by a loving cup—a tribute from New Orleans to its Best Citizen a woman,—was presented to the founder of the night school, Sophie Wright.

"Sometimes there does seem to be, even on this earth, a law of compensation. It has come to Sophie Wright, who was born in 1866

at a time when the South was poorest. At the age of three, becoming a cripple from a fall, she spent six years strapped in a chair. It must have been a time of pure torture for this child to remain inactive, with her eager questioning mind, desiring to drink thirstily from the fount of knowledge. Afterwards she completed her education in five years and opened a little school for girls. If she had been strong and well, she would in all probability have married, and whether happier for her or not, it certainly was better for the world, that she should have entered the arena .of public life and have become the intellectual mother of so many neglected children. She gave one thousand, five hundred and eighty-one pupils to the city of New Orleans when she turned over her night school to its care, and, like all mothers who send their children out into the world, she has her lonely moments. But honours are still showered upon her. The Girls' High School in New Orleans has just received the name of 'The Sophie Wright School,' and to all who know her she stands for the absolute triumph of Mind over Matter, the unanswerable evidence of a valiant soul conquering and surmounting the dragging flesh, and presenting an argument for the soul's immortality to the unbelieving."

Mrs. T. P. O'Conner, *My Beloved South* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914), 207-211.

Louisiana State University EDITOR

Notes And Comments

PERSONALS

History Department, Louisiana College: *New Appointments:* Edward McMillan of Texas Tech, chairman; Carroll Gates, assistant professor. Mrs. Lela B. Costello retired as associate professor after twenty-two years of service at Louisiana College.

Department of History, Louisiana State University in New Orleans: *1961-62 staff:* Trygve R. Tholfsen, chairman, Wayne Clegern, Thomas Harwood, Jerah Johnson, Joseph Brent, Henry Friedlander, Stephen Ambrose; *New Appointments:* Henry Huttenbach, Ph.D., University of Washington, Gerald Bodet, Ph.D. candidate, Tulane University. In addition Dean Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., and Dean Frank Massingill will teach courses in Louisiana history and Western Civilization, respectively.

Department of History, Louisiana State University: *1961-62 staff:* John L. Loos, Walter C. Richardson, T. Harry Williams, J. P. Moore, Robert B. Holtman, Burl Noggle, R. D. Higginbotham, Patrick C. Lipscomb, III, Jane Lucas deGrummond, Lucile Roy Caffery; *New Appointment:* Matthew Downey, B. A. and M. A., University of Indiana, Ph.D. candidate, Princeton University. *Leaves of absence:* E. A. Davis for academic year; Jane Lucas deGrummond for spring semester. John L. Loos will be acting head for the academic year.

Department of Social Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana: *1961-62 staff:* History: Amos E. Simpson, Magruder Drake, William H. Adams, Vincent H. Cassidy, Charles R. Stansifer, Walter R. Craddock, Paul J. Stewart, Robert W. Brockway, Craig A. Newton, Richard G. Neiheisel, John P. N. Wittenberg; Political Science: Edward B. Richards, John R. Faust, John A. Morgan, Jr., William R. Garner; Geography: Minnie Kelley, Robert M. Crisler, Allen D. Hellman, Robert M. Webb, Vernon Behrhorst, Theodore W. Kury; Sociology and Anthropology: Ben Kaplan, Henry G. Pitchford, Malcolm C. Webb. *Leaves of absence:* Sylvester Hemleben, history, Edward L. Kibbe, anthropology, Hubert G. Wilhelm, geography. Edward Richards has joined the list of abstracters for the publication of *Historical Abstracts.* Conrad Joiner of political science has resigned to accept a position at the University of Arizona.

Department of History, Tulane University: *Promotions:* Nels M. Bailkey and W. Burlie Brown to professor; Charles T. Davis, Raymond A. Esthus (Newcomb College), Thomas L. Karnes, and Hugh F. Rankin to associate professor; Henry A. Kmen to assistant professor. *New Appointment:* John D. Nichols, instructor at Newcomb College. *Leaves of absence:* John R. Hubbard (Newcomb College), spring semester to do research; William R. Hogan on Guggenheim Fellowship. Charles P. Roland is acting head for the 1961-62 academic year.

ALLIED ORGANIZATIONS

The Louisiana Colonials of New Iberia will open their 1961-62 program on Saturday, October 7 with a luncheon meeting. Mr. Charles L. (Pie) Dufour, columnist of the New Orleans *States-Item*, will be the guest speaker.

State Archives and Records Commission Chairman Wade O. Martin, Secretary of State, announces that the Commission's new acquisitions include the colonial, territorial, and other official records from two of the oldest parishes of Louisiana—Avoyelles and St. Landry. These papers were transfered to the Commission through the efforts of Gradney Couvillon, Clerk of Court of Avoyelles Parish, and Henry Lastrapes, Clerk of Court of St. Landry Parish, and Mrs. L. Austin Fontenot of Ringrose Plantation, Opelousas, Louisiana.

Winston De Ville, recently appointed Research Consultant to the Commission, is preparing for immediate publication a CALENDAR OF LOUISIANA COLONIAL RECORDS, VOLUME 1, AVOYELLES PARISH. This initial guide will be followed by a similar guide to the colonial papers of St. Landry Parish. As the Commission obtains additional document groups, the records will be rehabilitated, indexed, and made available to researchers. The Commission invites the active support of historians throughout the state in its attempt to preserve Louisiana's early records. Other Commission members are Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General, Roy R. Theriot, State Comptroller, John E. Regard, Director, Edwin A. Davis, Senior Consultant, and Raymond H. Downs, Assistant Director.

The Louisiana Genealogical and Historical Society, the Department of History, and the General Extension Division of the Louisi-

ana State University will sponsor the Fifth Annual Genealogical Institute to be held on the university campus January 12-13, 1962. An added feature of the 1962 Institute will be a seminar period which will allow time for study in specialized areas. Out-of-state speakers who are specialists in their fields will address the group.

The Opelousas Tourist Center and Museum celebrated its third anniversary in July. Almost 33,000 visitors from all 50 states and 44 foreign countries have toured the museum since it opened in 1958. The organization has recently issued a small four-page booklet giving interesting facts about the museum and Opelousas. The booklet was written by Colonel Dudley A. Tatman, museum curator, and edited by Mrs. L. A. Fontenot, Jr., museum commission chairman. Recent accessions include: a 25 by 25 inch model of an early Acadian house with a separate kitchen 14½ by 10½; a hay loader loaned by H. Hidalgo of Opelousas; an antique wooden thimbleholder donated by Mrs. Susan Stokes of Opelousas; and a copy of a September, 1935, edition of the *American Progress*, describing the death and funeral of Senator Huey P. Long and the realignment of the Long faction, given by Mrs. Roy Edwards of Melville.

MISCELLANY

F. Jay Taylor, Dean of Louisiana College, is program chairman for the 1962 annual meeting of the Louisiana Historical Association. Anyone with suggestions for the meeting is urged to contact Dean Taylor as soon as possible.

The Washington Artillery represented Louisiana at the centennial observance of the First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) in July. The group was selected by the Louisiana Civil War Centennial Commission to represent the state because of the important part played by the unit in the battle 100 years ago. The thirteen members of the 141st Artillery (Washington Artillery), Louisiana National Guard, were dressed in colorful nineteenth century Washington Artillery uniforms. An exhibit, mostly items appearing in the Louisiana Historical Association's Confederate Museum, 929 Camp Street, New Orleans, was displayed. Lieutenant Kenneth T. Urquhart, executive-secretary of the Association and a member of the guard, was in charge of the exhibit.

The Charles Didier Dreux exhibit, commemorating the 100th

anniversary of the death of Colonel Charles Didier Dreux, was opened in Confederate Memorial Hall, 929 Camp Street, New Orleans, in July. Colonel Dreux was the first Louisiana officer killed in the Civil War. In the display are Colonel Dreux's sword, buttons from his uniform and other memorabilia.

Book Reviews

MARRIAGE CONTRACTS OF NATCHITOCHES, 1739-1803. Translated and abstracted by Winston De Ville. Introduction by Edwin Adams Davis. (Nashville: Benson Printing Co., 1961. xv, 62 pp. Glossary, index. $10.00.)

In this little volume Winston De Ville has preserved, in abstract form and in English translation, some of the essential documents for the study of colonial Louisiana. Of the one hundred and fifty marriage contracts which he has listed here, he was able to locate the original instruments for ninety-seven. The leaching action of time has removed well over a third of the marriage records which ought to be available to the historian. As Dr. Edwin A. Davis and John C. L. Andreassen pointed out in the Louisiana Archives Survey, *Report No. 2*, such archival records as those of Natchitoches are reasonably safe only from a cataclysmic event of the nature of the atomic bomb—not from the ordinary vicissitudes and casual handling incident to storage in a parish courthouse. Until the day comes when the recommendations of the Louisiana Archives Survey are a reality and the early Natchitoches parish archives become the responsibility of an Archives Division of an Archives and Records Service, one can only be grateful that Winston De Ville has rescued a few of these documents from oblivion and probable loss, and has made them generally and easily available in abstract form. However, it is impossible not to regret that he came too late to save for us the 1740 marriage contract of Jean Baptiste Derbanne and Marguerite Victoria Gonzales, whose elopement from Spanish Los Adaes created an international incident, a scandal in the Church, and a permanent romantic legend in Natchitoches.

De Ville has arranged the ninety-seven abstracts in chronological order and provided a carefully prepared index, which is an alphabetical key to the names of the contracting parties and of their parents. It would, however, have been helpful if the names of the witnesses had also been included. An even more desirable addition to the index would have been that of the names appearing in his "supplementary list of other marriage contract entries found in the Natchitoches Parish Courthouse *Index of Conveyances*," for which the instruments could not be found. The abstracts, for the most

part, are for documents on file in the Natchitoches Parish Courthouse. Three were found in the LSU Archives and six in Red River Parish Courthouse. For those documents on file in bound volumes in the Natchitoches Parish Courthouse, De Ville gives precise location as to conveyance book and page number; for unbound instruments, he notes that they are kept in the office of the Clerk of Court. Undoubtedly an exhaustive search through the early records of trials in the Natchitoches parish court would reveal some additional marriage contracts which were attached as a part of the evidence. Moreover, De Ville has not attempted to trace down Natchitoches marriage contracts now in private hands; for example, he has not included the June 9, 1750 contract between Cesaire de Blanc and Marie des Douleurs Simone Juchereau de St. Denis, which was in the possession of Robert L. Carlos of New Orleans at the time Chambers printed it in his *History of Louisiana* in 1925. But it would be carping to deplore the absence of a few contracts in view of the extent of the list given. Throughout, De Ville has used the spelling of the original documents with the result that there is a wild variety in the forms even of proper names. A carefully prepared *Glossary* appears in the Appendix. This *Glossary*, together with the complete transcripts of two marriage contracts, should be most helpful to anyone who wishes to try his hand at deciphering the original manuscripts from which these abstracts were made.

As Dr. Davis points out in his admirable "Introduction" to this volume "many aspects of life in the Natchitoches region during the French and Spanish periods may be gleaned by a careful study of De Ville's translations and abstracts of the marriage records: birthplace of settlers, types of homes built in the area, social customs, general economic developments, and numerous other details in the field of economic, social and cultural history." Genealogists will, of course, find the book a godsend, and, one suspects, creative writers with a taste for the romantic past of Louisiana will find the little book a gold mine—if Miss Jean Jeffries' poem, "Natchitoches," which begins the volume, is any indication.

Since too often the preservation of the essential documents of Natchitoches's past has been the work of outsiders (Dr. John Sibley of Massachusetts, who rescued Benard La Harpe's *Journal of the Establishment of the French in Louisiana* from the mice; Herbert Eugene Bolton of Wisconsin, who salvaged the documents of Athanase de Mézières; Germaine Portre-Bobinski of France, who

retrieved many early documents in the five installments of her Natchitoches Series), it is pleasant to note that Winston De Ville is not only a native of Louisiana but a descendant of the St. Denis who founded Natchitoches. Mr. De Ville, who is currently a graduate student in the History Department of LSU and editor of the *Genealogical Register* of the Louisiana Genealogical and Historical Society, combines his illustrious ancestor's well-known flair for languages with a knack for getting a needed and difficult job done with little or no outside help.

Northwestern State College KATHERINE BRIDGES

RUDOLPH MATAS: A Biography of One of the Great Pioneers in Surgery. By Isidore Cohn, with Herman B. Deutsch. (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960. 431 pp. Illustrations, appendix, index. $5.95.)

The ninety-seven year life span of Dr. Rudolph Matas (1860-1957) encompassed a period which witnessed the revolutionary transformation of medicine into a modern science. In tracing the life and work of this great Louisiana surgeon, the authors have covered considerable ground in the field of Louisiana and American medical history, which adds to the general interest of the work. In addition to a detailed account of Matas's medical career, his biographers have supplied an abundance of information about his family background and relationships, his professional and personal contacts, as well as an insight into his personality.

Born in Bonnet Carre (fifty miles up river from New Orleans) to Spanish parents who had migrated to Louisiana from Catalonia only a few years before, Rudolph Matas spent the first decade of his long life moving about from place to place as the whims of his restless physician-adventurer father led the family to New Orleans, Paris, Barcelona, Texas, and Mexico. This cosmopolitan fling resulted in a trilingual young Matas, and he retained this fluency in Spanish, French, and English throughout his life, an ability of great value in his prodigious reading and researches into international medical developments. In 1877 Matas journeyed from Matamoros, Mexico, to New Orleans where he began the study of medicine at the Medical Department of the University of Louisiana (later Tulane). He received his M.D. degree in 1880, and for some sixty years thereafter in New Orleans he was actively engaged in the medical profession—continuing to perform surgery until he was almost eighty.

General practitioner, medico-historical scholar, and medical educator on the Tulane faculty, Matas made his greatest contributions in the field of surgery, a field still in its infancy of development at the beginning of his career. Rudolph Matas proved himself a master surgeon, displaying great skill, artistry, and bold imagination in his innovations. His greatest fame, even world renown, resulted from "the Matas operation" devised in response to an emergency situation in 1888 and performed for the second time in 1900 on the basis of firm conviction—the intrasacular suture for aneurism. This highly successful innovation marked a daring break with the long accepted method of Hunterian ligature and earned for Matas the title "Father of Modern Vascular Surgery." His fertile imagination, however, developed numerous other significant conceptions, techniques, and devices which further add to his stature as a pioneer surgeon—such as his insistence that the appendix was an intraperitoneal organ and that surgery was indicated as an early treatment if rupture seemed imminent; his experimental researches with intestinal suture aids; his suggestion of a preoperative dietary regimen for patients about to undergo surgery; his contrivance of a clamp to regulate the rate at which fluid might be given a patient intravenously; and his performance of the first operation attempted in America under spinal anesthesia. A five-page appendix to the book listing his degrees, honorary awards, foreign decorations, and official positions provides graphic testimony to the wide esteem in which Matas was held. At one time or another he was president of almost every important medical and surgical association in this country and the International Society of Surgery as well.

The highly readable journalistic style of the biography remains relatively clear even in the most technical portions. To some extent the conversational technique of the historical novel has been employed, and rather effectively, too. That device, however, together with the absence of the thorough documentation and detailed bibliography considered so vital by the professional historian, renders the book a "popular" rather than a "scholarly" biography—which in a sense is unfortunate. From the preface and the text it is apparent that the basic sources included Matas's personal diaries and his correspondence with family, friends, and associates, and his medical articles in the *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal* and other medical periodicals. Furthermore, Dr. Isidore Cohn's fifty-four years of association with Matas as student, colleague, and friend

clearly added another dimension to his telling of the story. Certainly the work represents a worthwhile contribution in the area of Louisiana medical history and biography as well as in the broader field of medical history in general for Dr. Matas's influence transcended state boundaries.

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Jo Ann Carrigan

A CONFEDERATE GIRL'S DIARY. By Sarah Morgan Dawson. Introduction by Warrington Dawson. Edited with a Foreword and Notes by James I. Robertson, Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960. 473 pp. Illustrations. $7.50.)

The reissuing of Sarah Morgan's diary, first published in 1913, makes readily available now another personal account of privations suffered by many Louisiana women and children during the Civil War.

When the war started, twenty-year-old Sarah lived in Baton Rouge, a member of a large family of divided loyalties. Her father, Thomas Gibbes Morgan, who had died recently, had been born a Northerner and had opposed secession but remained with his adopted state. Her oldest brother, a judge in New Orleans, remained a Unionist, and an older sister was married to a Federal officer in California. On the other side were her three younger brothers who joined the Confederate army, and two of them eventually died in service. Sarah and her sister Miriam were ardent Southerners, though Northern sympathies in the family tempered Sarah's violent outbursts against the Yankees.

Sarah began her diary in March, 1862, after the fall of New Orleans and before the seizure of Baton Rouge. At that time the large Morgan household included seventeen people: her excitable mother, two sisters (one older and married with five small children), and servants. In preparation for the imminent attack in April, Sarah obtained a pistol and carving knife and made a "running bag" to contain her personal items, all to be hidden beneath her hooped-skirt when flight became necessary. When Federal gunboats flying the Union flag appeared in the river in front of Baton Rouge, she was so incensed that she made a small Confederate flag and wore it downtown, expecting to be arrested any moment. After the Federals occupied the town, she was surprised to find that they were not all monsters, but General Butler's notorious "woman order"

in New Orleans so infuriated her that she forgot her tolerance and again armed herself with the pistol and knife, lest some Yankee try to "Butlerize" her, as she said.

When the Confederates attempted to recapture the town, Sarah's household fled during the bombardment by the Federal gunboats preceding the Battle of Baton Rouge, August 5, 1862. The following months of exile were spent in the homes of friends in the country, mostly at "Linwood," a plantation house twenty miles from Baton Rouge. There, Sarah received an eye-witness account of the sacking of their home. At the end of August, she went back briefly and saw the destruction for herself: everything movable was gone and the remainder smashed.

Life in the country was tolerable largely because Confederate officers from Port Hudson, three miles from "Linwood," were so attentive to Sarah, Miriam, and their friends, especially after Sarah was injured severely in the back as a result of a fall from a carriage. That interlude ended when the Federal attack on Port Hudson began in March, 1863, and again the Morgan women fled, this time to the brother in occupied New Orleans. The move was difficult for Sarah, both mentally and physically. Fortunately, they had enough money to pay the exhorbitant price for food and transportation. They arrived in April, 1863, and mechanically took the oath of allegiance, an act that crushed Sarah, who kept her bitterness confined to her diary. Living in a neutral household where she could not express her opinions was bad enough, but she learned later that some of her officer friends who were captured at Port Hudson and Vicksburg were held prisoners in the city. Since she could not communicate with them out of respect for her brother's wishes, she turned to recording petty affairs and family grief over the loss of two brothers who died in Federal prison camps. She greeted the end of the war with an exhausted sigh of relief.

Educated privately, Sarah Morgan wrote well, reflecting her wide reading, culture, and refinement. Early entries in the diary, written during the seige of Baton Rouge, are often lengthy and somewhat melodramatic. She is at her best in describing the flight of the refugees from Baton Rouge, a moving account done with realism and a saving touch of humor. As the war dragged on, she came to distrust all war news and reported relatively little of it. Much of the diary is occupied with character sketches and analyses, at which she displayed insight and amusing satire. Throughout, Sarah, who

considered herself no belle, is always the somewhat aloof and proper young lady, as sharp in her criticism of the conduct of the ladies and gentlemen of her own class as of those below them.

In presenting this edition of the diary, Professor Robertson has added his own helpful foreword to the original introduction by Warrington Dawson, the diarist's son, and has furnished documentation identifying people and events. Unfortunately, his notes are not keyed to the text with the usual footnotes, but are placed at the end of the book in such a way that they are likely to be overlooked, thereby losing much effect.

Sarah Morgan's diary will remain one of the lively and significant personal records of Louisiana in the Civil War.

Texas A&M JOHN Q. ANDERSON

A CIVIL WAR TREASURY OF TALES, LEGENDS, AND FOLKLORE. By B. A. Botkin. (New York: Random House, 1960. 625 pp. Illustrations, index, forward. $7.95.)

A characteristic feature of the American has been his ability to make almost any situation humorous. And the Civil War, the nation's most intolerable war, gave the American ample material and great need for jesting.

B. A. Botkin, well known for his ability to collect folklore portrays through his selections, the pathos of the American's experience as well as his robust reaction to it. Although many of these jokes, tales and anecdotes are well known to Civil War historians, Botkin presents his survey in a refreshing and comprehensive manner. The reader is presented with the cunning, stupidity, daring, cowardice, devotion and perfidy that the war engendered from the time Lincoln arrived in Washington until the soldier sat at home reminiscing.

One also sees this span of time from many points of view. But whatever the story and whoever tells it, he is smiling. It is the Negro, for example, who explains how the colored man gained the privilege of fighting. Other generals refused to take Negroes into their ranks, but not General "Peg-leg" Butler. He reasoned, according to this take, that " 'cause his cavalry didn't have nothin' but black horses an' dem white men didn't look right on black horses, put dem Negroes on black horses and dey look jus' right."

And it is a Confederate who, at the end of the struggle conveyed its terrible irony in a single sentence. Weary and dirty, this man sat cooling his tired feet in a stream, while, with a rusty needle and coarse thread, he tried to mend his ragged coat. Suddenly a mounted Federal dashed into view and confronted the Confederate: "Hi, Johnny Reb. I've got you this time."

Without looking up from his mending the half-starved, ragged and dirty fellow replied: "Yes, and a h....l of a git you got."

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